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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays that investigate the influence of
religious beliefs on investor behavior and stock market outcomes. To
this end, we avail of data from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
countries. Our dataset is collected from highly religious societies that
have clear religious investment rules and explicit identification of both
institutional investors and stocks as either “Islamic” or “non-Islamic”.
The first essay of this thesis investigates whether religious-based trad-
ing practices impede market development. Our results show that non-
Islamic stocks in the markets of our study are relatively neglected,
have higher returns, lower liquidity, and face higher liquidity risk com-
pared to Islamic stocks. Our overall evidence, therefore, supports the
hypothesis of market segmentation. Our results highlight a potential
challenge for the stock markets of religious Islamic societies in seek-
ing to become globally competitive. The second essay investigates
whether religiosity affects stock market speculation. We find that an
increase of Muslims’ religiosity during the holy month of Ramadan
leads to lower levels of trading frequency, market volatility, and id-
iosyncratic volatility, as well as higher risk-adjusted returns. Our
iv
results indicate that religiosity is negatively related to stock market
speculation. The third essay investigates whether religiosity influences
the preference of institutional investors to hold lottery-type stocks.
We find that Islamic institutional investors deviate from their reli-
gious norms by holding more lottery-type stocks than do non-Islamic
institutional investors. This deviation may be explained by the ev-
idence that Islamic institutional investors have stronger information
signals to induce them to trade lottery-type stocks. Our results high-
light a challenge for the regulators and Islamic Shariah auditors in
countries that have Islamic institutions, namely, to ensure that the
operations of Islamic institutions are free from prohibited excessive
uncertainty (Gharar).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Culture has many dimensions, for which religion can be an important
component as well as a key aspect of life (Guiso et al. 2003). Recent
behavioral finance literature suggests that religion plays a significant
role in influencing risk attitudes, saving, financial decisions and other
economic issues (Baker & Nofsinger 2012). Such a behavioral under-
standing offers an additional hypothesis with which to explain stock
market anomalies. Nevertheless, the behavioral finance literature suf-
fers from several measurement and identification issues, leading to
no clear conclusive evidence (see, Lobe & Walksha¨usl 2016, Guenster
2012, Karle´n & Poulsen 2013).
The first objective of this research is to investigate whether religious-
based trading practices impede market development. As a natural
experiment, we use data from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
countries, which have clearly defined religious rules on investing in
stock markets. We find that non-Islamic stocks in these markets
are relatively neglected, have higher returns, lower liquidity, and face
higher liquidity risk compared to Islamic stocks. Our overall evidence,
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therefore, supports the hypothesis of market segmentation. Our re-
sults highlight a potential challenge for the stock markets of religious
Islamic societies in seeking to become globally competitive.
The second objective of this research is to investigate whether
religiosity affects stock market speculation. We use the data of the
GCC countries characterized by a high level of religiosity and clearly
defined religious rules on investing. We find that during Ramadan,
the stock markets of these countries encounter relatively lower levels
of trading frequency, volatility, and idiosyncratic volatility. We do not
find significant changes in returns during Ramadan compared to other
months. However, a drop in volatility leads to higher risk-adjusted
returns. Our results indicate that religiosity is negatively related to
stock market speculation.
The third objective of this research is to investigate whether re-
ligiosity influences the preference of institutional investors to hold
speculative (lottery-type) stocks. We use data from Kuwait, which
is characterized by a high level of religiosity, clearly defined Islamic
religious rules with regard to investing, and clear identification of
institutional investors’ religious identity. We find that Islamic insti-
tutional investors deviate from their religious norms by holding more
lottery-type stocks than do non-Islamic institutional investors. This
deviation may be explained by the evidence that Islamic institutional
2
investors have stronger information signals to induce them to trade
such stocks. Our results highlight a challenge for the regulators and
Islamic Shariah auditors in countries that have Islamic institutions,
namely, to ensure that the operations of Islamic institutions are free
from prohibited excessive uncertainty (Gharar).
In summary, we seek to contribute to an understanding of the in-
teraction between religion as a key component of culture and stock
market price formation. To this end, we avail of data from stock
markets that encompass well-defined Islamic and non-Islamic institu-
tional investors, as well as Islamic and non-Islamic stocks. Islamic
institutional investors and stocks are clearly identified due to explicit
rules for Islamic investments. Thus, our data provides a meaningful
illumination of the research issues. The results of our research are
expected to be important to the literature on the interaction between
religion and financial behavior, as well as having a direct significance
for stock market regulators, firms, and traders in Islamic countries.
This thesis consists of six chapters commencing with this introduc-
tory chapter. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the Islamic financial
industry. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are the empirical chapters presented
as three separate papers. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.
3
Chapter 2
Overview of Islamic Financial In-
dustry
2.1 Introduction
Islamic finance has been practiced throughout the Muslim world since
the Middle Ages. Indeed, many instruments and concepts of the Is-
lamic financial approach have been adopted and developed by Euro-
pean financial systems during and following the Renaissance (Ghaz-
anfar 2004). The modern revival of the Islamic financial approach can
be traced back to the mid-1980s, when globalization played a role in
shaping the modern Islamic financial industry. At this time, a demand
was created for Islamic financial products that would correspond with
modern Western financial products in their ability to fulfill investor
goals. Such modern Islamic financial products allow Muslims the op-
portunity to participate in financial markets, while preserving their
religious norms and values (Pepinsky 2013).
The Islamic financial approach is based on the boundaries of Is-
4
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Figure 2.1: Yearly Global Assets of Islamic Financial Services Industry ($bn).
Source: UKIFS, October 2013.
lamic law (Shariah), whereby transactions are governed by Islamic
laws in combination with the rules of corporate governance, risk man-
agement, and market regulators. These laws cover various kinds of
financial instruments, markets, financial intermediation, and trans-
actions (Zaher & Kabir Hassan 2001). Moreover, they influence the
nature and behavior of the institutional and individual participants
in financial markets (Hearn et al. 2012). The main concepts of the
Islamic financial approach are the prohibition of unfair transactions,
encouragement of risk sharing transactions, and support of the con-
cepts of the individual’s rights and duties, property rights, and fair
contracts.
The global Islamic financial services industry has been growing
rapidly, with world asset valuations of $1,460bn in 2012 (Figure 2.1).
As of 2012, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, United Arab Emirates
(UAE), Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar are the leading countries in the
Islamic financial industry (Figure 2.2).
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2.2 Religion and Islamic Financial Indus-
try
Islam reserves the option to be involved in commercial and finan-
cial trades on the basis of Islamic Shariah boundaries in the form of
prohibitions, norms, and ethics. Such norms and ethics require that
economic traders in a society avoid injustice and unfair dealing in
their financial activities. Islamic finance scholars argue that the rules
of Shariah and norms of Islamic finance can help to develop a sus-
tainable financial system and ensure fairness for investors, the com-
munity, and institutions. The main prohibitions of Islamic finance
include those of interest (Riba), gambling (Maysir), and excessive un-
certainty (Gharar) about assets or prices in exchanges (Ayub 2009).
6
2.2.1 Prohibition of Riba
A fundamental prohibition in Islamic finance is the prohibition of
interest (Riba). There is no ambiguity regarding the prohibition of
Riba in that all Muslim groups consider accepting interest (Riba)-
based dealings as sinful. The Holy Quran and other Islamic Shariah
sources strongly convict transactions based on interest (Riba). Riba
generally represents the return on transactions involving an exchange
of money for money, or that of an unfair increase paid above the
amount of the loan by the borrower. Islamic Shariah has prohibited
Riba on the basis that it generates imbalances in the economy. Pepin-
sky (2013) notes that Islamic scholars interpret the ban on interest as
an unfair trade that places the risk of the transaction on the borrower,
who must repay the loan regardless of whether he/she earns a profit
from the use of the loan. Islamic scholars hold that an appropriate
contract form is one that allows risk to be shared by both contract
parties. The goal of a vast body of modern studies on Islamic finance
is to determine how to produce financial products on the basis of risk
sharing.
7
2.2.2 Prohibition of Maysir
The second major prohibition in Islamic Shariah is Maysir, which
is the Arabic translation for gambling or game of chance (lottery-
type). All instruments such as lotteries, wherein coupons or tabs with
incentives provided by an uncertain and unknown event depending on
luck, or disproportionate prizes that are distributed by a drawing of
lots, or where the participating persons avail themselves of a chance
at prizes, are unacceptable to Islam. This is because only a small
number of the participants of such schemes receive a reward at the
cost of others, without undertaking liability or work (Ayub 2009).
Financial derivatives, such as options and futures contracts that are
settled through price differences only, are considered gambling.
2.2.3 Prohibition of Gharar
The third major prohibition of Islamic finance is that of excessive un-
certainty (Gharar), which refers to the hazard or uncertainty caused
by the absence of clarity about the asset or price in the agreement or
exchange details. Islamic Shariah prohibits transactions and contracts
that involve components of excessive uncertainty (Gharar). Gharar
occurs if the obligation of any of the contract parties is uncertain or
if the obligation is of a kind that relies on obligation. In other words,
8
Gharar can be present in transactions that contain excessive uncer-
tainty, the sale of an asset over which the seller has no control, a con-
tract in which the price has not been finalized, or future exercise date
is not recognized. Thus, Islamic finance scholars prohibit engagement
in activities such as excessively speculative trades in shares, short-
selling, trading in unknown items, and trading in derivatives (Ayub
2009).
2.3 Stock Markets in Islamic Context
The role of stock markets is important in all economies; they are or-
ganized to serve two conceptual markets: the primary market, which
provides for the initial public offering, and secondary market, which
enables asset holders to trade previously created shares (Al-Masri
2007). Thus, the primary market allows investors to subscribe funds
to business enterprises seeking to grow their operations. This move-
ment of funds from surplus to deficit units seeking to raise new capital
by issuing equity is one of the main roles of the stock markets in both
Western and Islamic stock market theory (Zaher & Kabir Hassan 2001,
Al-Masri 2007).
The secondary markets also play an important role in the Islamic
finance paradigm, but they have systems that differ from their West-
ern counterparts. Taj el din (1996) considers that Islamic stock mar-
9
kets are concerned more with Islamic ethics than with market effi-
ciency. According to Taj el din (1996), in Islamic financial markets,
the regulator must guarantee that the transactions are free from in-
terest (Riba) and excessive uncertainty (Gharar). Once these Shariah
requirements are met, regulators are left with the regulations and cri-
teria that support and increase social benefits. Thus, the regulators
are required to be extremely careful in analyzing and determining the
benefits and costs of the financial system’s regulations.
Many countries with a majority Muslim population have estab-
lished stock markets that are Western-designed markets with laws
and practices that do not rigorously follow the laws of Islam (Zaher
& Kabir Hassan 2001). Iran and Sudan appear to be the only coun-
tries with fully compliant Islamic stock markets (Pryor 2007). Coun-
tries, such as Bahrain, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia,
Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and UAE have now
established stock markets with Western-designed laws and practices,
but with both Islamic and non-Islamic stocks listed in their markets
(mixed markets).
2.4 GCC Stock Markets
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region comprises six countries:
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
10
Emirates (UAE). GCC countries have mixed markets with both Is-
lamic and non-Islamic stocks. Thus, they have Western-designed laws
and practices combined with Islamic laws that are specific to Islamic
institutions. Islamic institutions in these countries are either institu-
tions with an Islamic operation license or institutions that mentions in
their articles of association that they operate within Islamic Shariah.1
In order for a firm to be considered fully Shariah compliant, so that its
stocks are allowable for all Islamic investors to trade, it must abide by
all Islamic finance codes. In the GCC, the level of religiosity is high,
as shown in Table 2.1. Thus, the appearance of distinctly Islamic
trading behavior in these countries is expected to be strong.2
Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics of GCC stock markets
for the year 2012. In terms of total market capitalization, Saudi Ara-
bia is the largest market. Saudi Arabia has the highest stock market
in terms of the trading value as a percentage of GDP and turnover
ratio, while Kuwait has the highest number of listed domestic firms
compared to other GCC countries.
The following chapters of this thesis consists of three essays that
investigate the influence of religious beliefs on investor behavior and
stock market outcomes. To this end, we avail of data from the GCC
1See, for instance, the law of the Islamic operation license of Kuwait.
https://www.cma.gov.kw/.
2For example, Islamic traders are expected to trade subject to Islamic Shariah
law, and are restricted to trading stocks of firms that comply with Islamic laws.
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countries. Our dataset is collected from highly religious societies that
have clear religious investment rules and explicit identification of both
institutional investors and stocks as either “Islamic” or “non-Islamic”.
Table 2.1: Religious Indicators of GCC Countries
This table presents a religiosity index from the Gallup Survey as of 2009 for GCC. The table also
presents the percentage of Muslims to the total population and the total population in million
taken from the PEW Research Center, as of its 2011 report “The Future of the Global Muslim
Population”.
Country Religiosity Index Muslims to Total Population
(2009) Total Population (%) (million)
Bahrain 94 81.2 1.26
Kuwait 91 86.4 2.74
Oman - 85.2 2.78
Qatar 95 77.5 1.76
Saudi Arabia 93 97.1 27.45
UAE 91 76.0 7.51
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of GCC Stock Markets
This table compares GCC stock markets in the year 2012. Market capitalization of listed compa-
nies is in billions U.S. dollars and based on the listed domestic companies. Market capitalization
of the listed companies as percentage of the GDP is also based on listed domestic companies.
Trading value is calculated as the total value of shares traded during the year divided by the
GDP of the year. Turnover ratio is calculated as the total value of shares traded in the year
divided by the average market capitalization for the year. The number of listed companies
includes only the domestic companies. The data is from the World Bank database.
Country Market Cap Market Cap Trading Value Turnover Listed
($bn) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) Ratio (%) Companies
Bahrain 16 52 1.0 1.9 43
Kuwait 97 56 13.2 23.2 189
Oman 30 40 3.5 8.8 155
Qatar 126 67 8.1 12.2 42
Saudi Arabia 373 51 70.1 144.4 158
UAE 68 18 4.7 25.3 102
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Chapter 3
Effects of Religious Beliefs on Stock
Returns, Liquidity, and Liquidity
Risks
3.1 Introduction
Social norms significantly influence an individual’s general behavior
(Ku¨bler 2001), investor preferences (Kim & Venkatachalam 2011), and
financial decisions (Baker & Nofsinger 2012), and, consequently, their
stock market trading behavior and outcomes (Fabozzi et al. 2008,
Hong & Kacperczyk 2009, Baker & Nofsinger 2012).
There is a growing trend for socially acceptable investing (Baker
& Nofsinger 2012), which has impacted the investment and regulatory
environment (Sparkes 2001). Investors prefer to invest in categories
of stocks that conform with their norms, such as socially responsi-
ble, ethical, environmental, and faith-based investing, and to neglect
stocks that conflict with their norms, such as sin, polluters, and non-
14
Islamic stocks (Baker & Nofsinger 2012).
Following Merton’s (1987) market segmentation theory, neglected
stocks in a segmented market should outperform other stocks, com-
pensating investors for limited risk-sharing. What is not so well un-
derstood is the extent to which market segmentation as an outcome
of religious beliefs enhances or impedes overall market behavior; for
example, the extent to which exogenously observable beliefs interact
with stock returns, trading practices, and liquidity.1
In this study, we use data with an Islamic religious background
to investigate returns and liquidity, as well as the liquidity risk dif-
ferences between stocks that are neglected by investors because they
conflict with social norms and stocks that can be characterized as con-
forming with social norms.2 Specifically, we contribute by examining
the influence of social norms on liquidity and liquidity risk in Islamic
1Liquidity is recognized as a significant component in our understanding of
asset pricing. Market traders understand that the time and cost of exercising
trades are important features of stock market performance. Following the Global
Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007–2009, stock market regulators and participants
have been made particularly aware of the significance of liquidity in financial
markets. Research suggests that market returns can be linked to a stock’s liquidity
(Amihud 2002) and that liquidity risk is priced into the stock market (Chordia
et al. 2000, Pastor & Stambaugh 2001, Acharya & Pedersen 2005).
2Following Amihud et al. (2012), stock market liquidity can be viewed from
two broad dimensions: the current level of liquidity and liquidity risk. Liquidity
implies low transaction costs and low price impacts when trading; liquidity risk
is, therefore, the risk that a stock’s level of liquidity will be reduced when the
stockholder wishes to sell. Following Acharya & Pedersen (2005), liquidity risk has
three dimensions: (i) commonality in liquidity with the market liquidity, (ii) return
sensitivity to market liquidity, and (iii) liquidity sensitivity to market returns.
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societies.
Although a number of studies examine the effect of social norms
on stock returns, there is no standard definition as to what defines
a norm-conflicting or norm-conforming stock (Lobe & Walksha¨usl
2016).3 Consequently, we have a range of norm-based screening strate-
gies reflecting different political, religious, and ethical perspectives
(Guenster 2012). Studies that focus on examining the performance of
norm-conflicting stocks also use different definitions, which may ex-
plain the differences in their results (Karle´n & Poulsen 2013). In our
study, we use data from societies that offer relatively unambiguous
religious guidance for norm-conflicting and norm-conforming stocks.
Muslim societies are able to unambiguously define norm-conflicting
stocks as non-Islamic stocks and norm-conforming stocks as Islamic
stocks. Moreover, we may expect that a significant portion of re-
tail investors will follow Islamic trading rules in these societies as
the level of religiosity is high. The level of religiosity is considered
higher than that pertaining to previous studies (France, Germany,
and U.S.), where differences of emphasis between Christian denomi-
nations are the focus.4 Furthermore, Islamic institutional investors in
3A good example would be the defense industry in the U.S.; it is not clear
whether it is considered an ethically acceptable industry by American social norms
(Hong & Kacperczyk 2009).
4According to a Gallup 2009 survey, the societies of the GCC countries included
in our data have a strong belief that religion is important in daily life. In Bahrain,
94% of people believe that religion is important in life, 91% in Kuwait, 95%
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the GCC are guided by strict, explicit rules prohibiting investment in
non-Islamic stocks. In this less ambiguous setting, our study provides
deeper insights as to how religious background may affect investment
decisions and corresponding market outcomes.
We contribute by providing evidence that sheds light on whether
social norms impede markets from becoming more competitive. For
instance, the Saudi Arabian stock market has recently become open
to foreigners and is seeking billions of dollars from the private sector.5
Nevertheless, Islamic investors in Saudi Arabia are guided strictly by
Islamic law and may invest only in Shariah compliant stocks. Hence,
the market is subject to significant segmentation if a majority of in-
vestors trade only these stocks, which may have the effect of discour-
aging non-Islamic firms from listing in this market.
Our study finds that norm-conflicting (non-Islamic) stocks expe-
rience significantly higher returns, lower liquidity and higher liquidity
risk in comparison with norm-conforming (Islamic) stocks across all of
the GCC countries. Thus, the implications of our study are important
for regulators in this region. We suggest that the market segmentation
in Qatar, 93% in Saudi Arabia, and 91% in UAE. In countries that have been
used to examine the influence of religious background on financial decisions in
prior studies, the percentage of people who believe that religion is important in
life is much lower (e.g., France 30%, Germany 40%, and U.S. 65%). Source:
http://www.gallup.com.
5For more information, read the 15 June 2015 Wall Street Journal article by
Ahmed Al-Omran and Rory Jones: “Saudi Stocks Slip as Foreigners Gain Access”.
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problem be addressed before the stock markets in Islamic societies can
become globally competitive.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next sec-
tion presents the background and hypotheses development. Section
3.3 presents data and descriptive statistics. Section 3.4 presents the
empirical tests. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Background and Hypotheses Devel-
opment
3.2.1 Background
Each society defines morality and norm-conflicting investments in dif-
ferent ways. What is perceived as sinful differs between societies and
changes over time (Fabozzi et al. 2008). Thus, it is difficult to provide
a single global definition for norm-conflicting stocks. Some studies
define such stocks as “sin” stocks, which are typically stocks of com-
panies that operate in industries considered sinful from the perspective
of a particular set of social norms. For example, many studies in re-
lation to Western societies regard stocks of companies in the alcohol,
tobacco, and gaming industries as sin stocks (Hong & Kacperczyk
2009, Salaber 2009, Durand et al. 2013). Other studies include stocks
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that are associated with biotechnology alteration, weapons, and adult
services in the definition of sin stocks (Fabozzi et al. 2008). Further,
Lobe & Walksha¨usl (2016) identify stocks in industries associated with
alcohol, adult services, defense, gambling, nuclear, and tobacco as sin
stocks. Guenster (2012) argues that it is difficult to give a single
global definition for norm-conflicting stocks that reflects the fact that
people have different political, religious, and ethical views.
In the same way that it is difficult to define norm-conflicting stocks,
it is difficult to define norm-conforming stocks. Norm-conforming may
refer to value-based, socially responsible, socially aware, green, and
ethical investing (Schueth 2003). Baker & Nofsinger (2012) define
socially responsible investing (SRI) as an investment strategy that
takes into consideration ethical, religious, and political values. In
more recent times, investing based on social norms has been expanded
to include criteria such as political issues, equality for women, labor
rights, anti-nuclear activism, environmental issues, human rights, and
religious criteria (Schueth 2003).
Religion is a basis for moral standards (Baker & Nofsinger 2012).
Some societies use religion-based definitions for norm-conflicting and
norm-conforming stocks. For instance, the Arab world defines sin in-
vestments on a religious basis, which differs from the Western world
(Fabozzi et al. 2008). Most religions have criteria for what is consid-
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ered acceptable. Investing based on social norms has a deep-rooted
religious history that goes back to biblical times, when Judaism set
investment criteria to conform with social norms from a religious per-
spective (Schueth 2003).
Islamic societies define sin stocks in a religious context (Fabozzi
et al. 2008). Stocks of industries that conflict with Islamic Shariah,
such as usury, sales of pork, and casinos, are considered norm-conflicting
investments from the Islamic viewpoint (Durand et al. 2013). Ghoul
& Karam (2007) compare screening strategies for Christian and Is-
lamic “faith-based” investment funds with SRI. They conclude that
although there are some differences in the strategies of Christian, Is-
lamic, and SRI screening criteria, they share a similar philosophy.
3.2.2 Hypotheses Development
Previous studies have examined the performance of norm-conflicting
and norm-conforming investments.6 Fabozzi et al. (2008) examine the
returns of norm-conflicting sin stocks from 21 countries for the pe-
riod 1970–2007 and find that sin portfolios outperform the common
benchmarks by 19% annually. Their definition of sin includes alcohol,
gaming, biotechnology alteration, tobacco, weapons, and adult ser-
6A detailed summary of the related studies in regard to the performance of
norm-conflicting and norm-conforming investments is presented in Table 3.11 in
Appendix III to this chapter.
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vices industries. Moreover, Hong & Kacperczyk (2009) examine the
influence of social norms on stock returns for a sample of 184 U.S.
sin stocks and find that these stocks outperform the relative market
benchmarks.Other authors find similar results, concluding that sin
stocks enjoy abnormal returns (e.g., Fauver & McDonald 2014, Luo
& Balvers 2014).
Although most of the studies concentrate on examining the re-
turns of norm-conflicting stocks in comparison to the common market
benchmarks, a limited number have examined the returns of norm-
conflicting stocks in comparison to the returns of norm-conforming
stocks. Thus, Durand et al. (2013) examine the influence of social
norms on both “saints” and “sinners”. Their findings suggest that
sin stocks outperform both the market benchmarks and saint stocks.
They define saint stocks as stocks included in the MSCI KLD400 So-
cial Index, which consists of the 400 highest environmental, social, and
governance (ESG) rated U.S. companies. This is qualified by Lobe &
Walksha¨usl (2016) who employ data for 31 sin and SRI international
indexes, and find that the sin portfolios do not significantly outper-
form the market benchmarks and SRI indexes. Liston & Soydemir
(2010) compare the performance of “faith-based” and “sin” stocks in
a religious context.7 Their results indicate that sin portfolios outper-
7They define faith-based portfolios in a religious context. They use the Dow
Jones Islamic Index and Ave-Maria Fund (based on Catholic values) to calculate
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form both the market and faith-based portfolios.
The literature suggests that norm-conflicting stocks earn positive
abnormal returns and that these positive abnormal returns persist as
long as these stocks are neglected by a significant portion of investors
(Guenster 2012). This is consistent with the theoretical framework of
Merton (1987), who anticipates that, in equilibrium, investors require
a higher return from neglected stocks because the unsystematic risk
of these stocks is priced to reflect “limited risk sharing” (Guenster
2012). Moreover, Hong & Kacperczyk (2009) argue that sin (norm-
conflicting) stocks are underpriced because they have a lower investor
base in comparison to regular stocks. Their argument is based on the
“neglect” assumption and the theoretical framework of market seg-
mentation of Merton (1987). Specifically, Hong & Kacperczyk argue
that sin stocks are neglected by large institutional investors and sell-
side analysts. Consequently, sin stocks have less information available
to investors and must compensate investors with a higher return.
The performance of norm-conforming investing has been addressed
in the context of Islamic stocks from the perspectives of mutual funds
(Hayat & Kraeussl 2011, Bukhari & Azam 2015) and stock indexes
(Al-Khazali et al. 2014, Canepa & Ibnrubbian 2014, Ho et al. 2014,
Jawadi et al. 2014, KR & Fu 2014, Ashraf 2016). However, whereas
the faith-based portfolio return.
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some studies find that Islamic investments outperform non-Islamic
investments, other studies either suggest the opposite or find that
there is little or no difference (Merdad et al. 2015).
In mixed markets, where Islamic and non-Islamic stocks are listed
on the same stock exchange, Islamic investors trade only stocks of
firms that comply with Islamic Shariah.8 For instance, as displayed
in Appendix II to this chapter, Kuwait Finance House, one of Kuwait’s
major institutional investors, clearly states in its Articles of Associ-
ation that it should not invest in those stocks that do not comply
with Islamic Shariah rules. This implies that Kuwait Finance House
must decline to invest in 69% of the stocks listed on the Kuwait Stock
Exchange (KSE).
We have observed that norm-conflicting stock portfolios typically
outperform the market (Fabozzi et al. 2008, Hong & Kacperczyk 2009,
Kim & Venkatachalam 2011, Luo & Balvers 2014) as well as outper-
forming norm-conforming portfolios (Liston & Soydemir 2010).Thus,
we expect non-Islamic (norm-conflicting) stocks to outperform Islamic
(norm-conforming) stocks and compensate investors for their limited
risk sharing. This leads us to our Hypothesis 1:
8Islamic institutional investors are expected to follow Islamic rules, as they have
a Shariah board committee that ensures institutional transactions are acceptable
within Shariah rules. Moreover, in countries with a Muslim majority and high
level of religiosity, we may expect that a significant portion of retail investors follow
Islamic trading rules, as is the case for markets in our study (see, for instance, the
Gallup Religiosity Index).
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Hypothesis 1: Norm-conflicting (non-Islamic) stocks outperform
norm-conforming (Islamic) stocks.
Hong & Kacperczyk (2009) suggest that a norm-conflicting stock
premium can be explained by a neglect effect. Their finding supports
the neglect effect explanation that sin stocks are neglected by large
institutional investors and analysts. They also expect that sin stocks
should have lower liquidity (they actually find an insignificant liquid-
ity difference between sin and other market stocks). Luo & Balvers
(2014), using Amihud’s 2002 illiquidity ratio as a liquidity proxy, find
that sin (norm-conflicting) stocks have a smaller investor base and
lower liquidity than regular stocks. In contrast, norm-conforming
stocks are expected to have a higher investor base, as they are more
widely accepted. Fernando et al. (2009), using a bid-ask spread liq-
uidity measure, confirm that stocks of environmental firms (norm-
conforming) have higher stock market liquidity.
In an Islamic context, Abdullah & Bacha (2001) examine the im-
pact of the decision to add or delete a stock from the list of norm-
conforming Halal stocks on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, and
find that the inclusion of a stock on the Halal list has a positive
impact on trading volume, whereas deletion has a significant nega-
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tive effect in the 60-day window post-announcement.9 In a mixed
market, all traders trade Islamic stocks, but only non-Islamic traders
trade non-Islamic stocks. Thus, Islamic and non-Islamic stocks have
different levels of investor bases in mixed markets. We expect that
in these markets, the higher investor base of Islamic stocks will in-
crease their trading volume and liquidity, in comparison to non-Islamic
stocks (e.g., Tauchen & Pitts 1983, Amihud et al. 1999). Thus, our
Hypothesis 2 is as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Norm-conforming (Islamic) stocks are more liquid
than are norm-conflicting (non-Islamic) stocks.
The uncertainty of future liquidity leads to liquidity risk (Amihud
et al. 2005). Acharya & Pedersen (2005) introduce a liquidity-adjusted
form of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) that captures ex-
pected liquidity and three types of liquidity risk. The three liquidity
risk factors (betas) used in our study are as follows: (i) commonality
in liquidity with the market liquidity, cov(ci, cM); such a relationship
is anticipated because investors expect to be rewarded for holding a
security that becomes illiquid when the market, in general, becomes
illiquid (Acharya & Pedersen 2005); (ii) return sensitivity to market
liquidity, cov(ri, cM); Acharya & Pedersen (2005) find that cov(ri, cM)
9Halal stocks are those that comply with Islamic Shariah rules.
25
affects required returns negatively because investors are willing to ac-
cept a lower return on an asset with a high return in times of market
illiquidity; and (iii) liquidity sensitivity to market returns, cov(ci, rM);
Acharya & Pedersen (2005) interpret this effect as due to the willing-
ness of investors to accept a lower expected return on liquid security in
a down-turned market. When the market declines, investors have less
wealth and the ability to sell easily is particularly valuable. Hence,
an investor is prepared to accept a lower return on stocks with low
illiquidity costs in states of low market return.
Liquid stocks have lower commonality with market liquidity, lower
return sensitivity to market liquidity, and lower liquidity sensitivity
to market returns (Acharya & Pedersen 2005). In other words, stocks
that are more liquid in absolute terms also tend to have lower liquidity
risk, which leads us to hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3: Norm-conforming (Islamic) stocks have less liquid-
ity risk than do norm-conflicting (non-Islamic) stocks.
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3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 Data
Our study is based on stock markets in religious Islamic societies that
have both “Islamic” and “non-Islamic” stocks, specifically the listed
firms in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) stock markets.10 Fig-
ure 3.1 displays the countries leading in the Islamic financial indus-
try: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, United Arab of Emirates (UAE),
Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. Five of the countries leading in the
Islamic financial industry are Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) coun-
tries: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar.
$0 $100 $200 $300 $400
Iran
Saudi Arabia
Malaysia
UAE
Kuwait
Bahrain
Qatar 2012
2011
2010
Figure 3.1: Size of Global Islamic Financial Services Industry by Country in ($bn).
Source: Global Islamic Finance Report 2013.
Islamic stocks in the GCC are the stocks of firms that operate
10Although these countries are oil producing countries, the oil industry is a
public industry. In fact, there is only a limited number oil-related firms that are
publicly traded. According to Datastream, there are only 2 listed companies in
Kuwait operating in oil-related industries, 2 in Saudi Arabia, 2 in Qatar, 0 in
Bahrain, and 0 in Dubai.
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following Islamic Shariah and have an Islamic Shariah board. Islamic
firms are identified by the Articles of Association, which determines
whether they operate within Islamic rules. The stocks of these firms
qualify fully as Islamic-compliant for which there is no need for Islamic
investor’s purification.11 Thus, the stocks of these firms are likely to
be preferred by Islamic investors.12
The GCC stock markets provide an opportunity to compare Is-
lamic and non-Islamic stocks. The GCC has advantages over other
countries with a Muslim majority because they have a clear and stable
classification of Islamic and non-Islamic stocks. The classification of
Islamic stocks in the other Muslim countries continues to be modified
(the stock can move from Islamic to non-Islamic classification though
11Purification is the process of eliminating the income resulting from interest
or other prohibited revenue sources from the portfolio dividends and capital gains
(e.g., Zaher & Kabir Hassan 2001, Hassan & Girard 2010).
12In practice, there are two general Islamic screening strategies in the mixed
markets; one is strict and the other is relaxed. The strict Islamic screening strategy
divides the stocks into two categories: (i) Islamic companies (norm-conforming)
and (ii) conventional companies or non-Islamic companies (norm-conflicting). The
relaxed Islamic screening strategy divides the stocks into three categories: (i) Is-
lamic companies (norm-conforming); (ii) non-Islamic companies, but which oper-
ate in Islamic-acceptable industries and have a low percentage of activities that
conflict with Islamic Shariah (norm-accepted by some Islamic traders); and (iii)
non-Islamic companies with a high percentage of activities that conflict with Is-
lamic Shariah (norm-conflicting). Alotaibi (2014) finds that a growing number of
Islamic individual and institutional investors are adopting a strict Islamic screen-
ing strategy, and this adoption arises from religious preferences. Further, he finds
that many Islamic individual and institutional investors question the Shariah com-
pliance of the relaxed Islamic screening strategy. Thus, in our research, we depend
on the strict Islamic screening strategy to define norm-conforming and norm-
conflicting stocks.
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time). Malaysia, for example, has a more relaxed and less stable clas-
sification for Islamic stocks, and Iran has a fully-compliant Islamic
stock market (so that we cannot compare non-Islamic and Islamic
stocks, (Pryor 2007)).
Our study, therefore, consists of the five stock markets of the GCC
countries that have a high Muslim population, with both Islamic and
non-Islamic stocks listed in the same market (Table 3.1).13
We follow the list of the Al-Mashora and Al-Raya for Islamic Fi-
nancial Consultancy to identify the Islamic-listed stocks in these stock
markets.14 Table 3.2 shows the number of Islamic listed companies in
each of the stock markets in our study.15 Because non-Islamic stocks
dominate these countries, our analysis does not contain the selection
bias that could arise due to higher Islamic stocks in countries with
Islamic religious practices.
The data is sourced from Thomson Datastream, with the excep-
tion of the Kuwait market for which we used Bloomberg as our source
13We do not include Abu Dhabi and Oman stock markets in our analyses as
both markets have a small number and percentage of Islamic listed companies
(9% in Abu Dhabi and 1% in Oman).
14As stated, investors can directly distinguish between Islamic and non-Islamic
stocks in the GCC by observing the company articles of association. Based on
the same classification, there are several lists available for Islamic investors in the
GCC wishing to distinguish between Islamic and non-Islamic stocks (e.g., the Al-
Mashora and Al-Raya for Islamic Financial Consultancy list and the KFH Capital
list).
15We are not surprised that neither of the markets have more than 31% Islamic
stocks listed in their respective stock exchanges, as the Islamic financial industry
is fairly new in comparison to the conventional one.
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(due to limited availability in the Thomson Datastream). Our daily
data consists of stock closing prices, shares outstanding, and trading
volume for the period 2004–2014. For the same period, we also ob-
tained the firm specific variables, including firm size, firm age, and
market-to-book ratio.
Table 3.3 reports the industry concentration of Islamic and non-
Islamic stocks in the countries of our study, showing that the majority
of the Islamic stocks are concentrated in the banking, insurance, and
financial services industries. However, there is a significant presence
of industrial firms in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Given that religios-
ity plays an important role in investment and savings decisions, the
greater number of Islamic Shariah compliant firms in the financial ser-
vices industry reflects the demand for religious-based financial prod-
ucts in the markets of the GCC countries. For this reason, we control
for industry differences between Islamic and non-Islamic stocks though
our tests.
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
We commence by comparing non-Islamic and Islamic stocks time-
series returns using the Fama-French three factor model.16 The sum-
16In our time-series tests from 2007–2014, there are 96 observations. Previous
studies have estimated the coefficients in similar tests based on at least 60 obser-
vations (e.g., Fama & MacBeth 1973, Fama & French 1993, Chen et al. 2011)
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mary statistics for the time-series variables are presented in Table 3.4.
The dependent variable of our time-series tests is NMIt, the month
t return of the non-Islamic portfolio minus the return of the Islamic
portfolio.17 MRPt is the month t market risk premium for the stocks
universe. SMBt andHMLt are Fama-French size and book-to-market
return-mimicking portfolios, where SMBt is the difference of return
between small and big market capitalization portfolios in month t,
and HMLt is the difference of return between high and low book-
to-market portfolios in month t. We rank all stocks based on their
market capitalization and use the 50th percentile as a breakpoint be-
tween small and big size portfolios. The book-to-market breakpoints
are the 30th and 70th percentile to generate high, medium, and low
book-to-market portfolios.18
The means of NMIt indicate that, non-Islamic stocks outperform
Islamic stocks in the Bahrain, Dubai, and Kuwait and underperform
Islamic stocks in Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
Panel A of Table 3.5 reports the summary statistics for the re-
turn and liquidity panel regression variables. We report the excess
17Note that in all of our returns calculations, we exclude stocks that have been
suspended during the whole month. We identify these stocks as having zero trad-
ing volume during the month and without any price change. Including these stock
may lead to a bias in the results when we compare the average returns of non-
Islamic and Islamic portfolios because these stocks always have a zero monthly
return.
18Similar to Bauer et al. (2005), we used Style Research Ltd online tools to
construct Fama-French factor portfolios.
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return (EXRi,t), the log of the monthly firm market capitalization
(LSIZEi,t), the monthly log of the stock market-to-book ratio (LMBi,t),
average monthly return for the previous 12 months (RETi,t), the
monthly industry rolling beta (BETAi,t), and the log of the firm
age (LAGEi,t). We define liquidity using two proxies the monthly
turnover ratio (TOVi,t), and Karolyi et al.’s (2012) adjusted form of
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure:19
LILLIQi,t =
1
Daysit
Daysit∑
d=1
log
(
1 +
|Ritd|
V itd
)
, (3.1)
where Ritd is the return on day d in month t, and V
i
td is the trading
value in the local currency (in millions). The greater the stock price
response to the change in volume, the greater the LILLIQi,t.
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As shown in Panel A of Table 3.5, Qatar (Kuwait) provides the
highest (lowest) excess return during our sample period. Saudi Arabia
has the highest trading activity with a monthly average turnover of
around 131%, whereas Bahrain is the least active market.21
19The LILLIQ of Karolyi et al. (2012) is calculated by adjusting Amihud’s
(2002) illiquidity measurement, adding a constant, and calculating the log of the
daily illiquidity ratio, thereby reducing the influence of outliers.
20A comparison of Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio across countries is not pos-
sible because the ratio is affected by the differences in the magnitude of currency
units (Karolyi et al. 2012). However, in our study, this issue need not be of concern
since we are comparing the illiquidity ratio of norm-conflicting (non-Islamic) and
norm-conforming (Islamic) portfolios within a country, and not across countries.
21The turnover ratio data confirms previous studies, namely, that within the
GCC countries, the Saudi market has a very high turnover ratio and the Bahrain
market has a very low turnover ratio (Al-Khazali et al. 2007).
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Panel B of Table 3.5 reports the results of a median equality test
for the return and liquidity panel regression variables. This test allows
for a determination of whether Islamic stocks are inherently different
from non-Islamic stocks. We find that, at the median level, non-
Islamic stocks do not have significantly higher excess returns when
compared to Islamic stocks. However, the absolute median values
of excess returns for non-Islamic stocks are higher than those for Is-
lamic stocks. In terms of liquidity, the median equality tests indicate
that Islamic stocks have a significantly higher turnover ratio (TOV )
than non-Islamic stocks in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar; and that
Islamic stocks have a significantly lower illiquidity (LILLIQ) than
non-Islamic stocks in all markets with the exception of Dubai.22
22On 28 December 2011, the Kuwait Stock Exchange implemented significant
changes in its stock market legal system and micro-structure. The stock market
microstructure was changed from a broad-lot to an odd-lot trading system on 12
May 2012; this change in the trading system may have caused significant changes
in stock returns and prices (see for instance, Hauser & Lauterbach 2003). However,
in our study, this issue need not be of concern since the change in microstructure
happens for both non-Islamic and Islamic stocks.
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3.4 Empirical Tests
3.4.1 Returns Tests
Time-Series Return Tests
To test Hypothesis 1, we examine the monthly time-series returns of
Islamic and non-Islamic stocks, estimated by the Fama-French three
factor model:
NMIt = α + β1MRPt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + εt, (3.2)
where NMIt is the monthly return of a non-Islamic portfolio mi-
nus an Islamic portfolio, specifically, an equal-weighted portfolio long
in non-Islamic stocks and short in Islamic stocks; α is the intercept
that represents the excess return of non-Islamic stocks; MRPt is the
monthly market risk premium; SMBt is the return of a small minus
big market capitalization portfolio in month t; HMLt is the return of
a high minus low book-to-market portfolio in month t; and εt is the
exogenous error term.
The results for the time-series tests are displayed in Table 3.6.
We estimate the regression models for the period January 2007 to
December 2014. The results suggest that alpha is insignificant for all
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of the five markets including the factors of the Fama-French model,
suggesting that there is no return difference between norm-conflicting
(non-Islamic) and norm-conforming (Islamic) stocks, after controlling
for the fundamental factors applied in the literature.
Panel Regression Return Test
Baltagi (2008) and Hsiao (2014) suggest that panel data regression re-
duces problems associated with estimation bias and multicollinearity,
controls for individual heterogeneity, and specifies the time-varying
relation between dependent and independent variables. Thus, to ex-
tend the test of Hypothesis 1, and examine the relative performances
of Islamic and non-Islamic stocks more extensively, we apply a panel
test, while controlling for firm-specific characteristics, to determine
whether non-Islamic stocks outperform Islamic stocks. Thus, we esti-
mate stock returns as:
EXRi,t = α0 + α1Di,t−1 + βXi,t−1 + εi,t, (3.3)
where EXRi,t is the excess monthly return to the risk-free rate of
stock i, regressed on the lagged previous monthly values of firm return
predictors, which are Di,t−1 as a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the
stock is Islamic and 0 if non-Islamic; Xi,t−1 is a vector of firm-specific
characteristics; and εt is the error term. Xi,t−1 includes firm-specific
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variables that have been defined earlier, LSIZEi,t, LMBi,t, RETi,t,
BETAi,t, TOVi,t, and LAGEi,t.
23
The coefficient α1 indicates whether Islamic stocks have higher or
lower returns than non-Islamic stocks after controlling for firm-specific
characteristics. The null hypothesis is that α1 equals zero, whereas
our expectation is that it will be significantly less than zero.
Because the data are pooled (panel), heteroskedasticity and au-
tocorrelation may influence the ordinary least squares (OLS) results.
We include industry dummies and use a cluster-robust variance and
covariance estimators to give more conservative standard errors (Arel-
lano 2003). Furthermore, we include yearly dummy variables to con-
trol for the potential effect of changes in market trends that may
effect stock returns such as, the Global Financial Crises (Hui 2005,
Deng et al. 2013).
Table 3.7 shows the results of our panel tests. Almost all of the
significant results of the panel tests are consistent with those of prior
literature (with the exception of Saudi Arabia), which finds that ne-
glected non-Islamic stocks outperform Islamic stocks. These results
are consistent with the market segmentation theoretical framework of
Merton (1987) and the empirical results of neglected stock returns in
23Following previous studies to minimize the influence of the outliers, we take
the natural logarithm of the firm market capitalization, the stock market-to-book
ratio, and the firm age (Galema et al. 2008, Hong & Kacperczyk 2009).
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developed countries (Lemieux 2003, Ahrens 2004, Renneboog et al.
2008, Hong & Kacperczyk 2009, Luo & Balvers 2014).
One possible reason for the higher returns of norm-conforming (Is-
lamic) stocks in Saudi Arabia is the higher retail investor trading, as
cited by the Saudi Stock Market Report, 2015. In the Saudi Ara-
bia stock market, individual trading represents around 89% of the
total trading value. See, Saudi Arabia Stock Report, January 2015
(http://www.tadawul.com.sa).24 Previous research has shown that
religiosity is, in general, positively related to risk-aversion (Miller &
Hoffmann 1995, Hilary & Hui 2009, Noussair et al. 2013). Thus, it is
possible that the “segmentation” effect of our first hypothesis in Saudi
Arabia is offset by the higher risk-aversion of Islamic retail traders
who trade only Islamic stocks and require higher returns, leading to
no return difference between Islamic and non-Islamic stocks.
3.4.2 Liquidity Tests
To examine whether market segmentation creates liquidity differences
between norm-conflicting (non-Islamic) and norm-conforming (Islamic)
stocks, we apply a separate panel regression as:
Li,t = α0 + α1Di,t−1 + βXi,t−1 + εi,t, (3.4)
24For the same period individual trading represents around 41% in Bahrain,
71% in Dubai, 42% in Kuwait, and 61% in Qatar.
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where the dependent variable Li,t is the liquidity proxy for stock i at
time t. We use two liquidity proxies: TOVi,t, calculated as the monthly
trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding, and
Karolyi et al.’s (2012) adjusted form of Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity
ratio, LILLIQi,t.
25 Di,t−1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1
if the stock is Islamic and 0 otherwise. Xi,t−1 are the variables for
the firm-specific characteristics that are anticipated to affect stock
liquidity: LSIZEi,t, LMBi,t, RETi,t, and BETAi,t, as defined earlier
(e.g., Datar et al. 1998, Amihud et al. 2015).
Because the data are pooled (panel), heteroskedasticity and au-
tocorrelation may influence the ordinary least squares (OLS) results.
We repeat the tests including industry dummies and use a cluster-
robust variance and covariance estimators to give more conservative
standard errors (Arellano 2003).
As shown in Table 3.8, the results of the regressions are consis-
tent with Hypothesis 2. All of the significant liquidity differences, af-
ter controlling for firm-specific factors, suggest that norm-conflicting
(non-Islamic) stocks are less liquid than are norm-conforming (Is-
lamic) stocks. Specifically, for the TOV , we encounter higher and
significant values for Dubai, Kuwait, and Qatar Islamic stocks. For the
LILLIQ, the results are significant for Dubai, Kuwait, and Saudi Ara-
25Previous studies use the same liquidity proxies and suggest that they success-
fully capture the essential dimensions of the liquidity (Rahim & Nor 2006).
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bia, and reveal that Islamic stocks are more liquid than non-Islamic
stocks, after controlling for the firm-specific factors that affect stock
liquidity.
Overall, our results support Hypothesis 2 that norm-conforming
(Islamic) stocks attract more investor attention than do norm-conflicting
(non-Islamic) stocks.
3.4.3 Liquidity-Risks Tests
To test whether market segmentation creates a difference between Is-
lamic and non-Islamic stock liquidity risk, we use the liquidity risk fac-
tors of Acharya & Pedersen’s (2005) liquidity-adjusted CAPM. Their
liquidity-adjusted CAPM captures the expected liquidity and three
types of liquidity risk:
E(ri,t − rf,t) = E(cit) + λβ1i + λβ2i − λβ3i − λβ4i , (3.5)
where E(ri,t−rf,t) is the expected net return and E(cit) is the expected
relative illiquidity cost, and:
β1i =
cov(rit, r
M
t − Et−1(rMt ))
var(rMt − Et−1(rMt )− [cMt − Et−1(cMt )])
, (3.6)
β2i =
cov(cit − Et−1(cit), cMt − Et−1(cMt ))
var(rMt − Et−1(rMt )− [cMt − Et−1(cMt )])
, (3.7)
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β3i =
cov(rit, c
M
t − Et−1(cMt ))
var(rMt − Et−1(rMt )− [cMt − Et−1(cMt )])
, (3.8)
β4i =
cov(cit − Et−1(cit), rMt − Et−1(rMt ))
var(rMt − Et−1(rMt )− [cMt − Et−1(cMt )])
, (3.9)
and λ is identified as:
λ = E(rMt − cMt − rf ). (3.10)
The betas are described as follows: β1 is the classical CAPM beta
adjusted for the illiquidity cost; β2 measures the stock illiquidity sen-
sitivity to the market aggregate illiquidity (thus, the higher the β2,
the higher the liquidity risk and greater the expected return required
by investors); β3 measures the stock return exposure to market liquid-
ity shocks (thus, assets with more negative β3 have a higher required
return because these stocks are riskier); β4 measures the sensitivity of
a stock’s illiquidity cost to the market return (thus, the more negative
β4, the higher the risk and greater the expected return required by
the investors because risk-averse investors prefer stocks with liquidity
costs that do not rise when the market return falls).26
To calculate the Acharya & Pedersen (2005) model liquidity risk
26The liquidity risk betas in this model are associated with: (i) the commonality
in liquidity with the market liquidity cov(ci, cM ), (ii) return sensitivity to the
market liquidity cov(ri, cM ), and (iii) liquidity sensitivity to the market returns
cov(ci, rM ).
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betas of Islamic and non-Islamic stocks, we proceed as follows:
(i) For each month t of our sample, we estimate Karolyi et al.’s (2012)
adjusted form of Amihud’s (2002), LILLIQ.
(ii) In line with previous studies (Pastor & Stambaugh 2001, Acharya
& Pedersen 2005, Lee 2011), we calculate the innovation of the illiq-
uidity of the portfolios when computing the liquidity betas. This is
because liquidity is persistent and the level of autocorrelation in the
market illiquidity for the monthly data is high. To compute the mar-
ket illiquidity innovation, we run the following regression:
(LILLIQMt P
M
t−1) = a0 + a1(LILLIQ
M
t−1P
M
t−1) + ut, (3.11)
for the market portfolio as well as for the Islamic and non-Islamic
illiquidity portfolios. We estimate the innovations in illiquidity using
the first order autoregressive AR(1), as Equation (3.11), where the
residual, ut, of the regression is the illiquidity innovation. Moreover,
similar to Acharya & Pedersen (2005), we introduce the market cap-
italizations ratio PMt−1 as a scaling factor to ensure that the model of
illiquidity is relatively stationary.
(iii) Using these illiquidity innovations and returns, we estimate the
monthly liquidity risk rolling betas as Equations 3.7–3.9, based on
a 36-month rolling window. This is consistent with previous studies
that calculate the beta for asset pricing models based on a 36-month
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rolling window (e.g., Florackis et al. 2011). In addition, to capture the
total effect of the three liquidity risk dimensions, we follow Acharya &
Pedersen (2005) and Lee (2011) by calculating the net liquidity beta
as:
βLneti ≡ β2i − β3i − β4i . (3.12)
(iv) The final step is to test the difference between Islamic and non-
Islamic stock liquidity risk by running panel regressions after con-
trolling for firm-specific factors that affect stock liquidity, including
industry dummies and use a cluster-robust variance and covariance
estimators to give more conservative standard errors (Arellano 2003).
The means of the monthly liquidity risk betas, calculated based on
a 36-month rolling window, are reported in Table 3.9. As explained in
the methodology section, we analyze three liquidity risk dimensions
captured by liquidity risk betas: (i) β2 commonality in liquidity with
the market liquidity cov(ci, cM), (ii) β3 return sensitivity to market
liquidity cov(ri, cM), and (iii) β4 liquidity sensitivity to market returns
cov(ci, rM). The total influence of these liquidity risk betas is captured
by the net beta βLnet. A higher positive β2 as well as a higher negative
β3 and β4 indicate greater liquidity risk.
We present the betas of Acharya & Pedersen (2005) for norm-
conforming (Islamic) and norm-conflicting (non-Islamic) stocks sepa-
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rately. The results are reported in Table 3.9, and indicate that the
signs of β2, β3, and β4 are consistent with Acharya & Pedersen (2005).
In other words, β2 has a positive sign and β3 and β4 have negative
signs, indicating that the factors driving the liquidity premium in the
GCC countries are the same as those in the U.S. market. We con-
clude that Acharya & Pedersen’s (2005) model is suitable for testing
the liquidity difference between Islamic and non-Islamic stocks.
The results of the panel regression tests in Table 3.10 show that
β2 in all markets are significant and suggest that Islamic stocks have
lower commonality in liquidity with the market liquidity. We expect
that an asset’s required rate of return should increase when the asset
is subject to more commonality in liquidity with the market liquidity
(Chordia et al. 2002, Hasbrouck & Seppi 2001, Huberman & Halka
2001). In other words, investors expect to be rewarded for holding
non-Islamic stocks that have more commonality with the market liq-
uidity (more liquidity risk) than do Islamic stocks, which supports
Hypothesis 3.
The results of β3 are mixed. For Bahrain and Dubai, the results
are inconsistent with those of the previous literature. For β3, Acharya
& Pedersen (2005) find that stocks with high average illiquidity have
large negative values for the beta that represents the cov(ri, cM). In
other words, stocks that are illiquid in absolute terms also tend to
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have a greater return sensitivity to market liquidity cov(ri, cM).
The prior literature in relation to β4 suggests that illiquid stocks in
absolute terms also tend to have larger negative values for β4, as well
as high liquidity sensitivity to market returns (Acharya & Pedersen
2005). Risk-averse investors prefer stocks with liquidity costs that do
not rise when the market return falls; thus, they require higher returns
from stocks with higher cov(ci, rM). In contrast with prior findings
in the literature, our results for β4 show that more liquid stocks in
absolute terms (Islamic stocks) have higher liquidity risk than do the
less liquid stocks (non-Islamic), in relation to cov(ci, rM). This may
support the idea that Islamic stocks are traded by Islamic traders
who are more religious and risk-averse than are non-Islamic traders
and require higher returns during financial crises as compensation for
high stock-liquidity sensitivity to market returns (Miller & Hoffmann
1995, Hilary & Hui 2009, Noussair et al. 2013).27
Our results for the three liquidity risk betas lead to mixed conclu-
sions. However, when we apply the net beta to capture the total effect
of the three liquidity risk dimensions, we find that the net beta βLnet
is significantly lower for Islamic stocks in all markets, suggesting that
norm-conforming (Islamic) stocks, in general, have relatively lower
27Previous findings suggest that Islamic stocks outperform the market only
during crises (Ho et al. 2014). Based on our liquidity-risk betas, this could be a
compensation for the higher liquidity sensitivity to declines in market returns.
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liquidity risk than do norm-conflicting (non-Islamic) stocks. This sup-
ports Hypothesis 3.
3.5 Conclusion
Existing research indicates that social norms have a significant influ-
ence on investor behavior. The question we address in this study is
whether investor social norms in relation to religiosity impede mar-
ket development. To address this issue, we avail of data from the
GCC countries. Investors in these countries have explicit Islamic
Shariah rules that prohibit trading norm-conflicting (non-Islamic)
stocks. Nevertheless, stock markets in these countries are seeking
to encourage the listing of local and foreign norm-conflicting stocks
as they strive to compete globally to become financial centers.
We test the conjecture that in markets that are dominated by
strong social norms, those stocks that conflict with the accepted norms
are relatively neglected. We find significant returns, liquidity and
liquidity risk differences between norm-conflicting (non-Islamic) and
norm-conforming (Islamic) stocks. Specifically, neglected non-Islamic
stocks have higher returns, less liquidity and more liquidity risk in
comparison to Islamic stocks.
It is important for regulators and institutions to understand the
consequences of investors’ behavior in response to stock returns and
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liquidity. Our results highlight the possible challenges that GCC coun-
tries will face as they seek to emerge as globally competitive stock
markets.
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Appendix I to Chapter 3: Tables
Table 3.1: Muslim Population of GCC
This table presents the percentage of Muslims to the total population as well as the total population in millions for the
GCC countries (from the PEW Research Center’s 2011 report “The Future of the Global Muslim Population”).
Country Muslims to Total Population
Total Population (%) (000,000’)
Bahrain 81.2 1.26
Kuwait 86.4 2.74
Qatar 77.5 1.76
Saudi Arabia 97.1 27.45
UAE 76.0 7.51
Table 3.2: GCC Stock Markets Descriptions
This table presents the number of listed Islamic firms in the stock markets of our study as of 31 December 2014 (based
on the list of Al-Mashora and Al-Raya for the Islamic Financial Consultancy). This table also reports the total market
capitalization as of 31 December 2014 for each stock market in U.S. dollars as well as the average market capitalization
for listed firms in each stock market in U.S. dollars (taken from Bloomberg).
Stock Number of Number of Percentage of Market Cap Average Firm
Market Listed Islamic Islamic in US$ Market Cap
Firms Firms Firms (%) (000,000’) in US$ (000,000’)
Bahrain 48 11 23 21,893 592
Dubai 71 20 28 80,236 2,483
Kuwait 203 62 31 101,179 562
Qatar 43 10 23 154,065 7,783
Saudi Arabia 167 39 23 482,145 2,720
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Table 3.3: Industry Distribution of Islamic and Non-Islamic Stocks
This table presents the industry distribution percentages of the listed Islamic and non-Islamic stocks in the stock markets
of our study as of 31 December 2014. The sector classification is from Worldscope’s General Industry Classification. The
percentage of Islamic stocks in each sector has been calculated as the number of Islamic stocks in that sector divided
by the total number of Islamic stocks in the market. We calculated the percentage of non-Islamic stocks in each sector
in the same manner.
Stock Market Industrial Utility Transportation Bank & Loan Insurance Financial
Bahrain
Islamic 0.0 0.0 0.0 62.5 12.5 25.0
Non-Islamic 56.7 6.7 0.0 13.3 10.0 13.3
Dubai
Islamic 16.67 0.00 0.00 41.67 33.33 8.33
Non-Islamic 48.65 5.41 5.41 13.51 21.62 5.41
Kuwait
Islamic 37.5 0.0 1.8 12.5 3.6 44.6
Non-Islamic 47.4 3.2 3.2 1.9 3.2 40.9
Qatar
Islamic 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 20.0 50.0
Non-Islamic 54.1 5.4 8.1 13.5 8.1 10.8
Saudi Arabia
Islamic 48.3 0.0 0.0 13.8 34.5 3.4
Non-Islamic 70.9 4.3 3.4 6.8 11.1 3.4
Table 3.4: Summary Statistics for Time-Series Regression Variables
This table presents the summary statistics for the time-series regression variables for 2007–2014. NMIt is the month t
return of the non-Islamic portfolio minus that of the Islamic portfolio. MRPt is the month t market risk premium for
the stocks universe. SMBt and HMLt are Fama-French size and book-to-market return-mimicking portfolios.
Stock Market NMI (%) MRP (%) SMB (%) HML (%)
Bahrain
Mean 0.11 0.24 -0.59 0.69
St. dev. 7 .20 2.49 6.04 6.49
Dubai
Mean 0.95 0.79 -0.76 1.22
St. dev. 3.44 10.06 4.46 6.02
Kuwait
Mean 0.17 -0.36 -0.36 1.02
St. dev. 3.27 6.45 5.49 6.35
Qatar
Mean -0.22 1.04 0.20 0.24
St. dev. 4.38 6.72 5.89 5.30
Saudi Arabia
Mean -0.12 0.59 -0.08 0.15
St. dev. 3.94 7.79 5.30 2.24
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Table 3.5: Summary Statistics for Return and Liquidity Panel Regression Variables
This table presents the summary statistics for the panel regression variables for 2007–2014. The mean is the time-series
average of means, median is the time-series median of means, and st. dev. is the time-series average of standard
deviations. LSIZEi,t is the monthly natural logarithm of the firm market capitalization in local currency in thousands,
LMBi,t is the monthly log of the stock market-to-book ratio, RETi,t is stock i’s average monthly return for the previous
12 months, BETAi,t is the rolling beta for the industry to which firm i belongs (calculated at month t based on the
previous 36 months), LAGEi,t is the log of the firm’s age calculated on a monthly basis, TOVi,t is stock i’s turnover
ratio for the month t, and LILLIQ is Karolyi et al.’s (2012) illiquidity ratio. Panel A reports the mean, median,
and standard deviation of the panel regression variables for the overall market data. Panel B reports the median
equality test between Islamic and non-Islamic stocks for the panel regression variables. The p-values correspond to a
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney signed rank median test.
Panel A: Mean, Median, and St. Dev.
Stock Market EXR (%) LSIZE (000’) LMB RET (%) BETA LAGE TOV (%) LILLIQ
Bahrain
Mean 0.25 10.70 0.16 0.33 1.00 8.99 0.38 0.45
Median 0.26 10.68 0.19 0.33 0.98 9.01 0.29 0.40
St. dev. 3.01 0.11 0.14 1.36 0.05 0.15 0.34 0.19
Dubai
Mean 0.59 14.16 0.22 1.65 0.96 8.72 10.43 0.12
Median 0.61 13.98 0.08 1.55 0.95 8.75 8.78 0.12
St. dev. 10.33 0.47 0.44 5.29 0.04 0.15 7.64 0.07
Kuwait
Mean -0.37 10.91 -0.10 -0.01 1.11 7.93 7.36 0.78
Median 0.20 10.77 -0.22 -0.11 1.08 7.91 6.02 0.65
St. dev. 5.81 0.34 0.31 1.96 0.09 0.30 4.36 0.42
Qatar
Mean 1.04 14.89 0.49 0.83 1.02 8.59 6.31 0.07
Median 1.13 14.88 0.43 1.30 1.01 8.64 5.22 0.14
St. dev. 6.72 0.28 0.20 2.40 0.05 0.21 3.80 0.14
Saudi Arabia
Mean 0.60 14.93 1.03 0.54 0.95 8.69 131.13 0.0018
Median 0.88 14.92 1.00 1.01 0.92 8.69 79.48 0.0012
St. dev. 8.03 0.25 0.22 2.33 0.06 0.16 18.33 0.00
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Table 3.5 (continued)
Panel B: Median Equality Test
Stock Market EXR (%) LSIZE (000’) LMB RET (%) BETA LAGE TOV (%) LILLIQ
Bahrain
Islamic -0.13 11.12 0.06 0.56 1.09 8.61 0.32 0.27
Non-Islamic 0.22 10.59 0.22 0.24 0.97 9.12 0.26 0.48
P-value (0.63) (0.00) (0.24) (0.65) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Dubai
Islamic -0.81 13.30 -0.66 1.39 1.01 8.20 8.54 0.099
Non-Islamic 0.14 14.28 0.35 1.42 0.94 8.89 8.32 0.103
P-value (0.67) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.58) (0.48)
Kuwait
Islamic 0.06 10.59 -0.33 -0.19 1.10 7.57 8.93 0.59
Non-Islamic 0.25 10.87 -0.16 0.00 1.08 8.04 4.91 0.64
P-value (0.84) (0.00) (0.00) (0.52) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Qatar
Islamic 0.96 15.02 0.54 0.62 1.18 8.66 6.42 0.03
Non-Islamic 0.95 14.84 0.42 1.46 0.96 8.63 4.44 0.07
P-value (0.91) (0.00) (0.00) (0.25) (0.00) (0.19) (0.00) (0.00)
Saudi Arabia
Islamic 0.26 14.57 0.82 1.00 0.95 8.45 51.28 0.001
Non-Islamic 1.47 15.01 1.09 1.64 0.90 8.74 80.83 0.0013
P-value (0.74) (0.00) (0.00) (0.41) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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Table 3.6: Return Time-Series Regression Tests
This table reports the coefficients of the portfolio long norm-conflicting (non-Islamic) and short norm-conforming (Is-
lamic) stocks (NMI ) from 2007–2014. MRP is an equally weighted market risk premium. SMB is the portfolio mimicking
the return difference between the stocks of small and big market capitalization companies. HML is the portfolio mim-
icking the return difference between high and low book-to-market stocks. The standard errors are in parenthesis and
have been adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West correction. ***1%, **5%, *10% level of significance.
Stock Market α MRP SMB HML
Bahrain
(1) 0.005 -1.448***
(0.006) (0.209)
(2) 0.006 -1.348 0.221**
(0.006) (0.210) (0.101)
(3) 0.006 -1.379*** 0.122 -0.162
(0.006) (0.209) (0.119) (0.107)
Dubai
(1) 0.010 -0.043
(0.010) (0.097)
(2) 0.011 -0.039 0.147
(0.010) (0.097) (0.197)
(3) 0.012 -0.026 0.114 -0.109
(0.010) (0.100) (0.204) (0.172)
Kuwait
(1) 0.001 -0.278***
(0.003) (0.051)
(2) 0.000 -0.281*** -0.188***
(0.003) (0.047) (0.050)
(3) 0.002 -0.199*** -0.235*** -0.185***
(0.003) (0.048) (0.048) (0.045)
Qatar
(1) 0.002 -0.380***
(0.004) (0.055)
(2) 0.002 -0.382*** -0.124**
(0.004) (0.054) (0.061)
(3) 0.003 -0.390*** -0.192*** -0.155**
(0.004) (0.053) (0.069) (0.077)
Saudi Arabia
(1) 0.000 -0.201**
(0.004) (0.046)
(2) 0.000 -0.188*** -0.112
(0.004) (0.047) (0.071)
(3) 0.000 -0.186*** -0.094 0.066
(0.004) (0.047) (0.076) (0.103)
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Table 3.7: Return Panel Regression Tests
This table reports the coefficients of the panel regressions for 2007–2014, including industry and year dummies. The
dependent variable EXRi,t is the monthly return net of the risk-free rate for stock i in month t, and Di,t is the dummy
variable equal to 1 if the stock is Islamic and 0 otherwise. LSIZEi,t is the monthly natural logarithm for the market
capitalization of firm i; LMBi,t is the monthly log of the stock market-to-book ratio; RETi,t is the stock i average
monthly return for the previous 12 months; and BETAi,t is the rolling beta for the industry to which firm i belongs,
calculated at month t based on the previous 36 months. TOVi,t is stock i’s turnover ratio for the month t, and LAGEi,t
is the log of the firm’s age. The standard errors are in parentheses. ***1%, **5%, and *10% denote levels of significance.
Stock Market D LSIZE LMB RET BETA TOV LAGE
Bahrain
(1) -0.005 -0.003**
(0.004) (0.001)
(2) -0.010** -0.0003 -0.015***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
(3) -0.012** 0.000 -0.018*** -0.199**
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.089)
(4) -0.013** -0.001*** -0.017** -0.209 -0.022**
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.089) (0.018)
(5) -0.013*** 0.000 -0.017*** -0.201*** -0.019** 0.857***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.086) (0.017) (0.151)
(6) -0.008*** -0.002 -0.014** -0.204** -0.018 0.865*** 0.005***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.007) (0.012) (0.098) (0.196) (0.004)
Dubai
(1) -0.019 0.003
(0.014) (0.004)
(2) -0.021 0.007 -0.003
(0.016) (0.007) (0.005)
(3) -0.025 0.011 -0.003 -0.156***
(0.022) (0.009) (0.007) (0.028)
(4) -0.026 0.010 -0.003 -0.157*** 0.038
(0.023) (0.009) (0.007) (0.029) (0.079)
(5) -0.011 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.032 0.003
(0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.060) (0.017)
(6) -0.017** -0.001 0.000 0.009 -0.021 0.015 -0.005
(0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.058) (0.018) (0.018) (0.004)
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Table 3.7 (continued)
Stock Market D LSIZE LMB RET BETA TOV LAGE
Kuwait
(1) 0.000 0.005***
(0.002) (0.001)
(2) 0.000 0.003*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
(3) 0.000 0.003*** 0.007*** -0.088***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.032)
(4) 0.000 0.003*** 0.007*** -0.107*** 0.037***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.034) (0.008)
(5) -0.008** 0.005*** 0.007*** -0.208*** 0.040*** 0.163***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.037) (0.008) (0.019)
(6) -0.009** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.043*** -0.258*** 0.166*** -0.002***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.043) (0.019) (0.002)
Qatar
(1) 0.002 0.002***
(0.003) (0.001)
(2) -0.001 0.000 0.023***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
(3) -0.002 0.000 0.028*** -0.221***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.084)
(4) -0.002 0.000 0.027*** -0.221*** 0.012
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.083) (0.016)
(5) -0.008** 0.007*** 0.022*** -0.283*** -0.005 0.218***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.089) (0.015) (0.036)
(6) -0.009** 0.006*** 0.025*** -0.002*** -0.324 0.219*** 0.004***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.014) (0.097) (0.038) (0.003)
Saudi Arabia
(1) 0.003* 0.005***
(0.002) (0.001)
(2) 0.004* 0.005*** 0.002*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
(3) 0.004* 0.006*** 0.003** -0.296***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.042)
(4) 0.004* 0.006*** 0.003** -0.294*** 0.014
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.042) (0.010)
(5) 0.004* 0.006*** 0.003** -0.293*** 0.015 0.000*
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.042) (0.010) (0.000)
(6) 0.005* 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.031*** -0.402*** 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.047) (0.000) (0.002)
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Table 3.8: Liquidity Regression Tests
This table reports the coefficients of the panel regressions for 2007–2014 for the liquidity proxies including industry
dummies. The dependent variables are the liquidity proxies; TOVi,t is the stock turnover ratio calculated as the
monthly trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding; and LILLIQ is the adjusted form of Amihud’s
(2002) illiquidity ratio. The independent variables are firm-specific factors and D is a dummy variable that is equal to
1 if the stock is Islamic and 0 otherwise. The standard errors are in parentheses. ***1%, **5%, and *10% denote levels
of significance.
Stock Market D LSIZE LMB RET BETA
Bahrain
TOV 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.009 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.019) (0.002)
LILLIQ -0.108 -0.038 0.094 0.715 0.052
(0.119) (0.030) (0.062) (0.685) (0.081)
Dubai
TOV 0.083*** 0.011 0.008 0.003 -0.099**
(0.017) (0.009) (0.007) (0.025) (0.043)
LILLIQ -0.060*** -0.046*** 0.030*** -0.035 -0.183***
(0.021) (0.008) (0.008) (0.040) (0.056)
Kuwait
TOV 0.053*** -0.009*** -0.003 0.582*** -0.011
(0.018) (0.005) (0.003) (0.110) (0.017)
LILLIQ -0.298*** -0.397*** 0.090*** -0.963 -0.104
(0.088) (0.036) (0.024) (0.661) (0.114)
Qatar
TOV 0.029** -0.032*** 0.024* 0.287 0.081***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.175) (0.039)
LILLIQ -0.036 -0.036 0.017 -0.272* -0.012
(0.041) (0.024) (0.031) (0.162) (0.028)
Saudi Arabia
TOV -0.002 -1.248 3.018 8.976 2.472
(0.609) (0.897) (2.138) (5.872) (2.185)
LILLIQ -0.001** -0.0004*** 0.0001 -0.018*** -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
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Table 3.9: Liquidity Risk Betas
This table reports the means of the monthly liquidity risk betas for 2007–2014 for Acharya & Pedersen’s (2005) liquidity
risk dimensions. The liquidity risk betas are calculated based on a 36-month rolling window. β2 represents the com-
monality in liquidity with the market liquidity cov(ci, cM ), β3 represents the return sensitivity to the market liquidity
cov(ri, cM ), β4 represents the liquidity sensitivity to the market returns cov(ci, rM ), and βLnet represents the total
effect of the liquidity risk betas. The standard errors of the means are in parentheses.
β2 β3 β4 βLnet
Bahrain
Islamic 0.490 -0.025 -0.024 0.539
(0.013) (0.006) (0.004) (0.020)
Non-Islamic 1.080 -0.017 -0.020 1.117
(0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008)
Dubai
Islamic 0.570 -0.038 -0.038 0.647
(0.039) (0.003) (0.002) (0.043)
Non-Islamic 1.072 -0.028 -0.020 1.120
(0.024) (0.002) (0.003) (0.020)
Kuwait
Islamic 0.793 -0.014 -0.027 0.835
(0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.015)
Non-Islamic 0.876 -0.017 -0.002 0.894
(0.012) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008)
Qatar
Islamic 0.546 -0.003 -0.059 0.608
(0.021) (0.010) (0.014) (0.033)
Non-Islamic 0.741 -0.021 -0.023 0.785
(0.018) (0.008) (0.006) (0.015)
Saudi Arabia
Islamic 0.012 0.001 -0.008 0.019
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Non-Islamic 0.014 -0.006 -0.005 0.025
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
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Table 3.10: Liquidity Risk Regression Tests
This table reports the coefficients of the panel regressions for 2007–2014 for Acharya & Pedersen’s (2005) liquidity
risk dimensions, including industry dummies. The dependent variables are the liquidity risk betas of the Acharya &
Pedersen (2005) model. The independent variables are D, dummy variable (equal to 1 if the stock is Islamic), and the
firm-specific factors. The standard errors are in parentheses. ***1%, **5%, and *10% denote levels of significance.
Stock Market D LSIZE LMB RET (%) BETA
Bahrain
β2 -0.560*** 0.031*** -0.074*** -0.385** 0.029
(0.015) (0.007) (0.022) (0.161) (0.072)
β3 -0.027*** 0.007*** -0.034*** 0.166** -0.015
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.066) (0.024)
β4 -0.009 0.009*** -0.033*** 0.094** 0.005
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.038) (0.022)
βLnet -0.523*** 0.015*** -0.007 -0.646*** 0.039
(0.020) (0.006) (0.023) (0.213) (0.066)
Dubai
β2 -0.460*** -0.018*** 0.009 0.017 0.042
(0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.019) (0.042)
β3 -0.007*** 0.002*** 0.001*** -0.002 0.034***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003)
β4 -0.016*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001 0.033***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003)
βLnet -0.437*** -0.021*** 0.006 0.020 -0.025
(0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.019) (0.042)
Kuwait
β2 -0.072*** 0.002 0.000 0.556*** 0.241***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.066) (0.025)
β3 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.212*** 0.185***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.028) (0.018)
β4 -0.024*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.057** 0.116***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.022) (0.012)
βLnet -0.054*** -0.011*** -0.010*** 0.287*** -0.061***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.056) (0.019)
Qatar
β2 -0.185*** 0.015*** 0.009 0.282 0.060
(0.010) (0.004) (0.016) (0.185) (0.107)
β3 0.005 -0.004 0.034*** -0.260*** 0.113*
(0.007) (0.003) (0.009) (0.079) (0.046)
β4 -0.053*** -0.003 0.033*** -0.192* 0.093*
(0.007) (0.003) (0.010) (0.076) (0.039)
βLnet -0.101*** 0.003 -0.011 0.002 -0.015
(0.008) (0.003) (0.012) (0.115) (0.046)
Saudi Arabia
β2 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.089*** 0.021***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.014) (0.007)
β3 0.007*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.061*** 0.008**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.004)
β4 -0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.043*** 0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.003)
βLnet -0.006*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.014*** 0.010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.003)
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Appendix II to Chapter 3: Islamic Insti-
tutional Investors
Islamic institutional investors are guided by explicit rules that prohibit
investing in stocks that conflict with Islamic Shariah rules. In addi-
tion, Islamic institutional investors are expected to have a Shariah
board committee that ensures institutional transactions are accept-
able within Shariah rules.
For example, Kuwait Finance House (KFH), an Islamic-listed in-
stitution on the KSE, notes in Article (5) of its Memorandum & Ar-
ticles of Association:
“Purchase shares, certificates of investment and similar financial pa-
pers, either for the account of the Company or for the account of
third parties provided that they do not conflict with the Is-
lamic Shariah .”
Article (7) of the KFH Memorandum & Articles of Association notes
that the institution has an independent Shariah board to ensure that
they operate within Islamic rules:
“An independent entity called the Fatwa and Shariah Supervi-
sory Board is to be founded in the Company which comprises no
less than three scholars who are specialized in Islamic Jurisprudence
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and hold university degrees in the subject to be appointed by the
Company’s General Assembly.”
As another example, the Aljazira Takaful Ta’wuni Company, one of
the Islamic-listed institutions on the Saudi Arabia Stock Exchange,
notes in its prospectus in Section (5):
“The company intends to exercise cooperative insurance activity in
the protection and saving sector in compliance with the pro-
visions of Islamic Shariah , in accordance with the Cooperative
Insurance Companies Control Law issued by Royal Decree No. M/32
on 02/06/1424H, and there is no intention currently to change the
activity.”
Section (7) of the Aljazira Takaful Ta’wuni Company prospectus notes
that it has a Shariah board to ensure that it operates within Islamic
rules and to:
“Approve the company products after affirming their compliance
with the principles of Islamic Shariah .”
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Appendix III to Chapter 3: Summary of
Main Previous Studies
This appendix consists of summaries for the related studies in re-
gard to the performance of norm-conflicting (non-Islamic, unethical,
or sin) and norm-conforming (Islamic, ethical, or socially responsi-
ble) investments. Table 3.11 reports several aspects of the reviewed
studies, including their aims, sample periods, data types, performance
tests used, and main findings.
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Table 3.11: Related Studies of the Performance of Norm-Conflicting and Norm-Conforming Stocks
Study
(Authors
& Date)
Aims Sample & Period
Data
Type
Performance
Tests
Main Findings
Hakim &
Rashidian
(2002)
To examine the effect
of Islamic Shariah on
performance,
diversification, and
risk, and to examine
the correlation and
long-term relationship
between Islamic and
non-Islamic indexes
 U.S., Dow Jones
Islamic Market
Index (DJIM), and
Wilshire-5000
Index (W5000):
1999–2002
Index-level  Sharpe ratio
Using risk-adjusted
returns, the Islamic
index outperforms its
conventional
counterpart. Thus,
the filtering criteria
adopted to eliminate
stocks that do not
comply with Islamic
Shariah does not
affect the
performance of the
Islamic index
Hussein
(2004)
To compare the
performance of
Islamic investments
with their
benchmarks
 FTSE Global
Islamic Index and
All-World Index:
1996–2003
Index-level
 Sharpe ratio
 Treynor index
 Jensen’s alpha
 Capital asset
pricing model
(CAPM)
 Cumulative
returns (CRs)
There is no return
difference between the
Islamic index and
FTSE All-World
index over the entire
period. However, the
Islamic index
underperforms its
counterpart index in
the bearish market
period
Elfakhani
et al. (2005)
To compare the
performance of
Islamic and
non-Islamic mutual
funds
 46 Islamic mutual
funds: 1997–2002
Fund-level
 Sharpe ratio
 Treynor index
 Capital asset
pricing model
(CAPM)
 Fama-French
three-factor model
In general, there is no
risk-adjusted return
difference between
Islamic and
non-Islamic mutual
funds
Hussein &
Omran
(2005)
To examine the
short-term and
long-term
performance of the
Dow-Jones Islamic
index
 Dow-Jones
Islamic index:
1996–2003
Index-level
Short-term
analysis:
 Sharpe ratio
 Treynor index
 Jensen’s alpha
Long-term
analysis:
 Cumulative
abnormal returns
(CARs)
 Buy-and-hold
abnormal returns
 Jensen abnormal
return model
Islamic indexes have
positive abnormal
returns over the
entire period, but
they underperform
their conventional
counterpart during a
bearish market
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Table 3.11 (continued)
Study
(Authors
& Date)
Aims Sample & Period
Data
Type
Performance
Tests
Main Findings
Brammer
et al. (2006)
To examine the
relationship between
corporate social
performance and
stock returns
 U.K.: 2002–2005 Stock-level
 Cross-sectional
regressions
 Fama-French
three-factor model
 Carhart
four-factor model
Corporate social
performance is
negatively related to
stock returns
Abdullah
et al. (2007)
To compare the
performance of
Islamic and
conventional mutual
funds
 Malaysian capital
market: 1992–2001
Fund-level
 Sharpe ratio
 Adjusted Sharpe
ratio
 Jensen’s alpha
 Timing and
selectivity ability
Conventional funds
perform better than
Islamic funds during
bullish economic
conditions, while
Islamic funds perform
better than
conventional funds
during bearish market
conditions
Fabozzi
et al. (2008)
To examine the
performance of sin
stocks
 Australia,
Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany,
Hong Kong, Italy,
Japan, Korea,
Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal,
Singapore, Spain,
Sweden,
Switzerland,
Taiwan, U.K., and
U.S.: 1970–2007
Stock-level
 Capital asset
pricing model
(CAPM)
Sin portfolios
outperform common
benchmarks
Galema
et al. (2008)
To examine the effect
of socially responsible
investments (SRIs) on
stock returns
U.S. stocks
included in:
 S&P 500 Index:
1990–2006
 Domini 400 Social
Index: 2001–2006
 Russell 1000:
2001–2006
 Russell 2000:
2003–2006
Stock-level
 Carhart
four-factor model
 Fama-MacBeth
regression
The demand
difference between
socially responsible
investments (SRIs)
and non-SRIs is
reflected in a stock’s
book-to-market ratio
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Table 3.11 (continued)
Study
(Authors
& Date)
Aims Sample & Period
Data
Type
Performance
Tests
Main Findings
Hashim
(2008)
To investigate the risk
and returns
associated with the
Islamic index
 FTSE Global
Islamic Index,
FTSE All-World
Index, and
FTSE4Good Index:
1999–2007
Index-level
 Capital asset
pricing model
(CAPM)
The Islamic index
outperforms the well
diversified socially
responsible index
(FTSE4Good)
Hong &
Kacperczyk
(2009)
To examine whether
social norms against
sin stocks affect stock
market outcomes
 U.S., and for
robustness:
Canada, France,
Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain,
Switzerland, and
U.K.: 1985–2006
Stock-level
 Capital asset
pricing model
(CAPM)
 Fama-French
three-factor model
 Carhart
four-factor model
 Cross-sectional
tests
 Panel regressions
 Fama-MacBeth
regression
Sin stocks are
neglected by
norm-constrained
institutions; they
receive less analyst
coverage and higher
expected returns than
do the comparable
stocks
Statman &
Glushkov
(2009)
To examine the
returns of socially
responsible
investments (SRIs)
 Stocks rated by
KLD (social
responsibility
characteristics)
Stock-level
 Capital asset
pricing model
(CAPM)
 Fama-French
three-factor model
 Carhart
four-factor model
Neglecting sin stocks
results in
disadvantage for
socially responsible
portfolios relative to
conventional
portfolios
Hassan &
Girard
(2010)
To examine the
performance of
Islamic indexes and
non-Islamic
counterparts
 Dow Islamic
Canada, Dow
Islamic United
Kingdom, Dow
Islamic United
States, Dow Islamic
Asia Pacific
Developed, Dow
Islamic Europe
Developed, Dow
Islamic Emerging
Markets, and Dow
Islamic World
Developed Markets:
1996–2005
Index-level
 Sharpe ratio
 Treynor Index
 Jensen’s alpha
 Fama’s selectivity
analysis
 Carhart
four-factor model
There is no return
difference between
Islamic and
non-Islamic indexes
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Table 3.11 (continued)
Study
(Authors
& Date)
Aims Sample & Period
Data
Type
Performance
Tests
Main Findings
Liston &
Soydemir
(2010)
To examine the
performance
difference between sin
and faith-based
portfolios
 Dow Jones
Islamic Index and
Ave-Maria Fund
(Catholic values):
2001–2007
Index-level
 Capital asset
pricing model
(CAPM)
 Fama-French
three-factor model
 Carhart
four-factor model
Sin portfolios
outperform
faith-based portfolios
Hayat &
Kraeussl
(2011)
To examine the risk
and return of Islamic
equity funds
 145 Islamic equity
funds divided into
five geographical
categories: global,
Malaysia,
Asia-Pacific,
Europe and
Middle-East, and
North America:
2000–2009
Fund-level
 Capital asset
pricing model
(CAPM)
 Multivariate
regression model of
Treynor and Mazuy
Islamic equity funds
underperform the
conventional equity
benchmarks
Kim &
Venkatacha-
lam
(2011)
To examine whether
higher information
risk in the form of
poor financial
reporting quality
explains sin stock
outperformance.
 U.S.: 1988–2006 Stock-level  Ecker three-factor
model
The financial
reporting quality of
sin firms is superior,
and, despite superior
returns and higher
financial reporting
quality, sin stocks are
neglected by investors
Abbes
(2012)
To examine the risk
and return of the
Islamic market
indexes compared to
the conventional
indexes
 35 indexes from
developed,
emerging, and GCC
markets: 2002–2012
Index-level
 Sharpe ratio
 Capital asset
pricing model
(CAPM)
There is no difference
in risk-adjusted
returns between
Islamic and
conventional indexes
Lobe et al.
(2012)
To compare the
performance of the
Islamic indexes to
conventional indexes
 155 Islamic
indexes and their
conventional
benchmark:
1996–2012
Index-level
 Sharpe ratio test
 Capital asset
pricing model
(CAPM)
 Carhart
four-factor model
There is no
performance
difference between the
Islamic and
conventional indexes
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Table 3.11 (continued)
Study
(Authors
& Date)
Aims Sample & Period
Data
Type
Performance
Measurements
Tests
Main Findings
Walksha¨usl
& Lobe
(2012a)
To examine the
performance of
Islamic indexes in
comparison to
conventional
benchmarks
 6 developed and
emerging markets
MSCI Islamic
indexes: 2002–2012
Index-level
 Sharpe ratio
 Treynor index
 Jensen’s alpha
 Omega measure
 Sortino measure
 Kappa 3 measure
 Galmar measure
 Excess return on
value at risk
 M2 measure
(risk-adjusted
returns
measurement)
Islamic indexes
outperform
(underperform)
conventional
benchmarks in
developed (emerging)
markets
Walksha¨usl
& Lobe
(2012b)
To examine whether
Islamic indexes
exhibit a different
performance to
conventional
benchmarks
 35 developed and
emerging markets:
2002–2011
Index-level
 Sharpe ratio test
 Capital asset
pricing model
(CAPM)
 Carhart
four-factor model
In general, there are
no performance
differences
Wan-Ni
(2012)
To examine the
performance and risk
of belief-based
indexes: ESG
(Environmental,
social, and corporate
governance), Islamic,
and Christian indexes
 Indexes from U.S.
and European
markets: 2001–2010
Index-level
 Sharpe ratio
 Treynor index
 Jensen’s alpha
 M2 measure
(risk-adjusted
returns
measurement)
 Capital asset
pricing model
(CAPM)
 Fama-French
three-factor model
Belief-based indexes
do not outperform the
standard benchmarks
Durand
et al. (2013)
To examine the
performance of both
saint (socially
responsible) and sin
stocks
 U.S.: 1990–2008 Stock-level
 Capital asset
pricing model
(CAPM)
 Fama-French
three-factor model
 Carhart
four-factor model
Sin stocks are
underpriced and
outperform socially
responsible stocks
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Table 3.11 (continued)
Study
(Authors
& Date)
Aims Sample & Period
Data
Type
Performance
Tests
Main Findings
Al-Khazali
et al. (2014)
To examine the
performance of
Islamic indexes
compared to
conventional indexes
 9 Dow Jones
Islamic indexes
with 9 Dow Jones
conventional
counterparts for
Asia Pacific,
Canadian,
Developed Country,
Emerging Markets,
European, Global,
Japanese, U.K.,
and U.S.:
1996–2012
Index-level
 Stochastic
Dominance (SD)
Conventional indexes
stochastically
dominate Islamic
indexes at the second
and third orders in all
markets except the
European market.
However, the
European, U.S., and
global Islamic stock
indexes dominate the
conventional ones
during the 2007–2012
period
Canepa &
Ibnrubbian
(2014)
To examine the
effects of religious
beliefs on stock prices
 Saudi Arabia
Stock Exchange:
2002–2008
Index-level  Stochastic
Dominance (SD)
Shariah compliant
stocks outperform
non-Shariah
compliant stocks
Fauver &
McDonald
(2014)
To examine the firm
valuation and excess
returns of sin stocks
 Stocks in G20
nations: 1995–2009
Stock-level
 Multivariate
regression
Sin stocks have excess
returns when
compared with other
stocks
Ho et al.
(2014)
To examine the
risk-adjusted
performance
difference between
Islamic and
conventional indexes
 U.S., U.K.,
Malaysia,
Indonesia, Hong
Kong, Switzerland,
India, and France:
2000–2011
Index-level
 Capital asset
pricing model
(CAPM)
 Sharpe ratio
 Treynor index
 Jensen’s alpha
Islamic indexes
outperform
conventional indexes
during financial crisis,
but there is no
difference for the
non-crisis periods
Jawadi
et al. (2014)
To examine the
performance of
Islamic and
conventional indexes
 Indexes for
Europe, U.S., and
World: 2000–2011
Index-level
 Sharpe ratio
 Roy ratio
 Treynor index
 Omega measure
 Jensen’s alpha
 ARCH model
 Information ratio
In general,
conventional indexes
outperform Islamic
indexes during
non-crisis periods;
however, Islamic
indexes have
outperformed since
the sub-prime crisis
began
KR & Fu
(2014)
To examine the
performance of
Shariah compliant
stocks compared to
conventional stocks
 Australian Stock
Exchange:
2001–2013
Stock-level
 Multiple
regression analysis
There is no difference
between the raw
returns of Islamic and
conventional stocks.
However, Islamic
stocks have higher
risk-adjusted returns
than do conventional
stocks
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Table 3.11 (continued)
Study
(Authors
& Date)
Aims Sample & Period
Data
Type
Performance
Tests
Main Findings
Luo &
Balvers
(2014)
To investigate
whether the return
differences across
industries can be
attributed to a
“boycott” factor
 Stocks listed on
NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ:
1963–2012
Stock-level
 Capital asset
pricing model
(CAPM)
 Fama-French
three-factor model
 Carhart
four-factor model
 Boycott CAPM
The outperformance
of sin stocks is caused
by their close
association with the
boycott factor
Bukhari &
Azam
(2015)
To examine the excess
risk-adjusted returns,
market volatility, and
systematic risk of the
Islamic and socially
responsible funds
 224 Islamic funds
and 573 socially
responsible funds:
2009–2013
Fund-level
 Capital asset
pricing model
(CAPM)
Islamic and socially
responsible funds
have similar
risk-return
characteristics
Merdad
et al. (2015)
To investigate the
Islamic effect on stock
returns
 Saudi Arabia:
2003–2011
Stock-level
 Panel regression
 Capital asset
pricing model
(CAPM)
 Fama-French
three-factor model
 Fama-French
three-factor model
with Islamic factor
Islamic stocks have
lower returns than do
conventional stocks
Ashraf
(2016)
To examine the
performance of
Islamic equity indexes
versus conventional
indexes
 29 international
Islamic equity
indexes constructed
by MSCI, DJ,
FTSE, and S&P,
and their
benchmarks:
2000–2012
Index-level
 Capital asset
pricing model
(CAPM)
 Seemingly
unrelated
regression (SUR)
In general, Islamic
equity indexes do not
produce any
abnormal returns
Lobe &
Walksha¨usl
(2016)
To examine whether
sin stocks outperform
socially responsible
investment stocks
 31 international
socially responsible
investment equity
indexes and sin
stocks in the
following
geographical levels:
Global, U.S., U.K.,
Australia, Japan,
Canada, Europe,
and Euro-Zone
Index and
stock-level
 Sharpe ratio
 Chen three-factor
model
 Fama-French
three-factor model
 Carhart
four-factor model
There is no difference
in returns between sin
stocks, socially
responsible stocks,
and the market
benchmarks
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Chapter 4
The Effect of Religiosity on Stock
Market Speculation
4.1 Introduction
Religion may be regarded as a key component of social norms influ-
encing investors’ speculative behavior (e.g., Kumar 2009, Hilary &
Hui 2009, Kumar et al. 2011, Kumar & Page 2014), stock market
outcomes (e.g., Durand et al. 2013, Canepa & Ibnrubbian 2014), and
stock market seasonality (e.g., Frieder & Subrahmanyam 2004).
Stock market trading is allowed under Islamic laws, but excessive
speculation is either unacceptable or strictly restricted because it in-
volves high uncertainty and is similar to gambling, which is strictly
forbidden by the Quran (Ahmed 2000, Naughton & Naughton 2000,
Kamali 1996, Al-Masri 2007, Zaher & Kabir Hassan 2001). Theoret-
ical and empirical findings suggest that excessive speculation is as-
sociated with high levels of market volatility, idiosyncratic volatility,
and trading frequency (Scheinkman & Xiong 2003, Dorn & Huber-
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man 2007, Dorn & Sengmueller 2009, Kumar et al. 2011, Pan et al.
2015). The theoretical framework of Tokic (2014) suggests that ex-
cessive speculation leads to high levels of market volatility and causes
bubbles and market inefficiencies.
Previous studies suggest that stock markets in Islamic societies ex-
hibit relatively higher return seasonality during Ramadan (Al-Hajieh
et al. 2011, Bia lkowski et al. 2012, Al-Khazali 2014). These studies
argue that the religious experience of Muslim investors during the Ra-
madan month leads to a positive sentiment and, hence, higher market
returns. However, there is a lack of methodological testing for this ar-
gument, and a lack of a coherent definition of sentiment in behavioral
finance that can lead to incorrect conclusions (Shefrin 2010).1
Ramadan is the ninth month of the Islamic (Hijri) calendar and
one of the most important religious events in the world. Around 1.6
billion Muslims observe this annual event, which requires fasting as
well as religious and spiritual practices. The fast of Ramadan is one of
the five pillars of Islam. It involves abstinence from eating, drinking
and other sensual pleasures, as well as strict control of desires. Ra-
madan has a well-defined rule specifying that Muslims shall fast from
dawn to sunset. In addition to fasting during the month of Ramadan,
Muslims are encouraged to read the entire Quran and recite special
1Moreover, these studies did not consider the effect on stock market speculation
and outcomes of change in the level of religiosity during Ramadan.
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prayers (Tarawih), which are held in the mosques each night of the
month. Muslims also ask forgiveness for past sins, pray for guidance
and help in refraining from everyday evils, and try to purify them-
selves through self-restraint and good deeds. These religious practices
lead to an increase in Muslims religiosity (Campante & Yanagizawa-
Drott 2015), and provide an ideal context with which to examine the
effect of religiosity on stock market speculation.
Our study examines whether speculative behavior can offer an
alternative explanation for Ramadan seasonality. In line with Blau
(2015), who suggests that religiosity is negatively related to stock
market speculation and volatility, we anticipate that an increase in
Muslim religiosity during Ramadan leads to a drop in stock market
speculation, which in turn, leads to lower market volatility, idiosyn-
cratic volatility, and trading frequency.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the
influence of religious events on stock market speculation in an Islamic
context. By understanding the link between speculative behavior and
religiosity, we attempt to explain the phenomenon of stock market
seasonality associated with religious events, which is not accounted
for by classical finance theory (e.g., Frieder & Subrahmanyam 2004).
In the context of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries,
the main results of this study may be summarized as follows. We
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find that these stock markets exhibit a significant drop in volatil-
ity, idiosyncratic volatility, and trading frequency during Ramadan.2
Although we find a significant drop in stock market excessive spec-
ulation, we do not find a significant drop in liquidity. Moreover, we
find no significant Ramadan return seasonality in the stock markets
of GCC countries. However, a significant drop in stock market volatil-
ity and idiosyncratic volatility during Ramadan leads to higher risk-
adjusted returns.
Differentiating between Islamic and non-Islamic stocks, we find
that Islamic stocks face a less significant drop in volatility, idiosyn-
cratic volatility, and trading frequency during Ramadan than do non-
Islamic stocks, which could be attributed to the fact that while reli-
gious Muslims trade only Islamic stocks and refrain from speculative
trading throughout the year, less religious Muslims trade non-Islamic
stocks and refrain from speculation only during Ramadan, when their
religiosity increases.
In addition to individual stock data, we use stock market index
2The GCC religious societies offer relatively unambiguous religious guidance for
stock market trading. According to a Gallup 2009 survey, the societies of the GCC
countries in our data have a strong belief that religion is important in daily life. In
Bahrain, 94% of people believe that religion is important in life, 91% in Kuwait,
95% in Qatar, 93% in Saudi Arabia, and 91% in UAE. In other countries that have
been used to examine the influence of religious background on financial decisions,
the percentage of people who believe that religion is important in life is much
lower (e.g., France 30%, Germany 40%, United States 65%). The religiosity index
is not available for Oman. For additional details, see: http://www.gallup.com.
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data to robustly confirm our findings. Specifically, we confirm that all
GCC countries face lower return volatility during Ramadan. Again,
we find no significant change in absolute returns performance, al-
though the risk-adjusted and idiosyncratic-risk-adjusted returns dur-
ing Ramadan show a significant increase.
This study has a number of implications. First, religiosity is nega-
tively related to stock market excessive speculation. Furthermore, the
increase in risk-adjusted returns during Ramadan is due to a decrease
in stock volatility. During Ramadan, Muslim religiosity increases and
excessive speculative trading is depressed because excessive stock mar-
ket speculation is either forbidden or undesirable in Islam. This be-
havior leads to lower market volatility, higher risk-adjusted returns,
and a more efficient market. Thus, this study provides an alternative
explanation for Ramadan seasonality.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section
provides the research background and develops our hypotheses. Sec-
tion 4.3 presents the data. Section 4.4 presents our research method-
ology. Section 4.5 provides our empirical results. Section 4.6 provides
further tests and analysis. Section 4.7 presents our robustness tests
with index data. Section 8 concludes the chapter.
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4.2 Background and Hypothesis Devel-
opment
4.2.1 Background
Following from such as Friedman & Savage (1948) and Markowitz
(1952b), a substantial literature on speculative behavior in finance
has emerged. A number of studies relate heterogeneity in speculative
behavior to heterogeneity in risk-aversion, which can be influenced
by religious beliefs (Kumar 2009, Kumar et al. 2011, Kumar & Page
2014). Such heterogeneity in investor behaviors may help to provide
explanations for phenomena that cannot be explained in traditional
financial theory within the mean-variance framework of Markowitz
(1952a). For example, risk-aversion heterogeneity suggests an ex-
planation for the diversification puzzle (why some investors do not
diversify their portfolios) (Statman 2004).
Islamic Shariah advocates a number of norms and ethical codes
to safeguard against unfair activities (Taj el din 1996). From the
perspective of Islamic Shariah, many practices in traditional stock
exchanges are undesirable, such as speculation leading to volatility in
share prices that is not related to economic value or to the underlying
performance of companies. In Islam, excessive speculation is forbidden
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because it involves high uncertainty and risk (Gharar) and is similar
to gambling, which is strictly forbidden in the Quran (Ahmed 2000,
Naughton & Naughton 2000, Kamali 1996, Al-Masri 2007, Zaher &
Kabir Hassan 2001).
These religious norms and ethical codes lead to a variation of the
speculative behavior among investors with different religious back-
grounds and different levels of religiosity (Kumar 2009, Kumar et al.
2011, Kumar & Page 2014). Furthermore, the religiosity level may
change within the same religious group over-time. For example, in
the month of Ramadan, religious practices lead to an increase in Mus-
lims’ religiosity (Campante & Yanagizawa-Drott 2015). This, change
in the Muslim level of religiosity over-time provides us with an oppor-
tunity to examine the effect of religiosity on stock market speculation.
In particular, to examine whether the increase in Muslims religiosity
during Ramadan leads to a drop in stock market speculation prox-
ies: volatility, idiosyncratic volatility, and trading frequency, as well
as higher market efficiency, and whether the change in speculative
behavior offers an explanation for Ramadan seasonality.
4.2.2 Hypotheses Development
The theoretical framework of Tokic (2014) suggests that excessive
speculation leads to higher levels of volatility. Empirical studies also
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find that speculative activities are often associated with high return
volatility (Scheinkman & Xiong 2003, Dorn & Huberman 2007, Dorn
& Sengmueller 2009, Kumar et al. 2011, Pan et al. 2015). For example,
speculation leads to increased market volatility as investors become
overconfident (Scheinkman & Xiong 2003, Mei et al. 2009, Du et al.
2011).
Stock market trading is allowed under Islamic laws, but stock mar-
ket speculation is either undesirable or forbidden. During Ramadan,
Muslims devote themselves to religious practices and become more
religious (Campante & Yanagizawa-Drott 2015). We conjecture that
with increased religiosity during Ramadan, Muslims speculate less in
the stock market, leading to less volatile markets. This leads us to
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1.a: Stock markets in Islamic religious societies have a
lower level of market volatility during Ramadan.
Idiosyncratic volatility is unsystematic risk that is related to a
particular asset. Malkiel & Xu (1997) find that idiosyncratic volatility
is related to stock returns. Their findings violate the assumption of
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), which states that systematic
risk is the only priced risk in the market. In a later paper, Malkiel
& Xu (2002) suggest that idiosyncratic volatility affects asset returns
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when investors are unable to hold the market portfolio. They state
that in reality investors are unlikely to hold the market portfolio due
to exogenous reasons. Hence, idiosyncratic volatility is priced.
Recent empirical findings also stand against the CAPM assump-
tions, suggesting that idiosyncratic volatility is priced. For example,
Brandt et al. (2010) suggest that overconfident investors who spec-
ulate in the stock market induce idiosyncratic volatility in returns.
Thus, increasing idiosyncratic volatility might reflect investors’ over-
confidence (Odean 1998). If the change in the idiosyncratic volatility
is caused by the change in speculative behavior (Dennis & Strickland
2004, Sousa & Serra 2008, Brandt et al. 2010, Doran et al. 2011),
we anticipate a reduction in individual stock idiosyncratic volatility
during Ramadan as an outcome of reduction in excessive speculation.
This leads us to establish the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1.b: Stock markets in Islamic religious societies have a
lower level of idiosyncratic volatility during Ramadan.
Following Dorn & Huberman (2007), speculative trading is the
main driver of trading frequency (turnover ratio), with such trading
frequency correlated with volatility. Assuming that trading frequency
is an indicator of speculation (Dorn & Huberman 2007, Kumar et al.
2011, Pan et al. 2015) and anticipating a decrease in speculative trad-
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ing during Ramadan, we have the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1.c: Stock markets in Islamic religious societies en-
counter a drop in trading frequency during Ramadan.
Previous studies argue that Ramadan as a holy month can have
a positive effect on Muslim psychology (e.g., Al-Hajieh et al. 2011,
Bia lkowski et al. 2012, Al-Khazali 2014) and that such investor sen-
timent can influence stock market outcomes (Edmans et al. 2007).3
Thus, Ramadan as a holy month has a positive influence on the psy-
chology of Muslim investors who participate in Ramadan, rendering
investors more optimistic and leading to more positive stock market
returns. However, this argument has not been methodologically tested
and lacks clear definition (Shefrin 2010).
Husain (1998) conducts an early study on the Ramadan effect by
testing the returns of the Pakistani equity market during Ramadan.
He finds a significant decline in stock market returns volatility during
Ramadan without significant change in returns. Seyyed et al. (2005)
examine the effect of Ramadan on weekly stock returns and volatility
in the Saudi stock market. They also find a significant decline in stock
market returns volatility during Ramadan without significant change
3A detailed summary of the studies that have been referenced in this chapter
with regard to the Ramadan effect is presented in Table 4.15 in Appendix II to
this chapter.
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in returns.
More recently, studies have analyzed the Ramadan return sea-
sonality for several stock markets of Muslim-majority countries (Al-
Hajieh et al. 2011, Almudhaf 2012, Bia lkowski et al. 2012, Al-Khazali
2014, Al-Ississ 2015). Al-Hajieh et al. (2011) examine whether Ra-
madan is reflected in positive calendar anomalies in Islamic Middle
Eastern stock markets. They find significant positive returns in Ra-
madan in 6 out of 8 countries for the period 1992–2007. In his study
for 1996–2007, Almudhaf (2012) finds evidence of Ramadan signifi-
cant positive returns in only 4 out of 12 Muslim majority countries.
Bia lkowski et al. (2012) find strong evidence of Ramadan significant
positive returns when considering the period 1989–2007 for 11 out
of 14 Muslim majority countries. More recently, Al-Khazali (2014)
suggests weak evidence of a Ramadan effect for 14 countries with a
Muslim majority over the period 1989–2012. Al-Ississ (2015) investi-
gates the holiday effect for 10 Muslim-majority countries pooling all
countries in one analysis between 1989–2012. He suggests a positive
change in stock returns during Ramadan. Thus, these studies have
provided somewhat mixed evidence on whether the stock markets of
Muslim majority countries exhibit positive returns during Ramadan.
In view of these considerations, we re-examine the following hypoth-
esis:
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Hypothesis 2: Stock markets in Islamic religious societies have pos-
itive absolute return seasonality associated with Ramadan.
Even if Hypothesis 2 is rejected, we expect that the lower return
volatility of stock markets during Ramadan leads to positive risk-
adjusted returns. Thus, we establish the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Stock markets in Islamic religious societies have pos-
itive risk-adjusted return seasonality associated with the Islamic cal-
endar holy month of Ramadan.
4.3 Data
Our study covers stock markets from countries that have high levels of
religiosity and a high percentage of Muslim population, specifically the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (see, Table 4.1). The GCC
region comprises six countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In contrast to other stock
markets in countries with a Muslim majority, we have a clear and
stable classification of Islamic stocks in the GCC. In the GCC we are
able to clearly distinguish between Islamic and non-Islamic stocks by
their article of association, which clearly distinguishes Islamic stocks
as those stocks of companies that conduct their regulated activities
in compliance with Islamic Shariah and have a Shariah supervisory
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board.4
We use the individual stock-level data obtained from Thomson
Datastream for the period 2006–2014. In order to include a stock
in our sample we require the stock price, trading volume, number of
outstanding shares, market capitalization, and book-value data. We
follow the list of the Al-Mashora and Al-Raya for Islamic Financial
Consultancy to identify the Islamic-listed stocks in these stock mar-
kets.5 Table 4.2 shows the number of Islamic listed companies in each
of the stock markets in our study. The table shows that Kuwait has
the highest percentage of Islamic stocks (31%) while Oman has the
lowest percentage (1%).
To facilitate our tests, we convert daily data based on the Gre-
4In practice, there are two general Islamic screening strategies; one is strict and
the other is relaxed. The strict Islamic screening strategy divides the stocks into
two categories: (i) Islamic companies (which have a Shariah board and operate
within Islamic laws) and (ii) conventional companies or non-Islamic companies.
The relaxed Islamic screening strategy divides the stocks into three categories:
(i) Islamic companies (which have a Shariah board and operate within Islamic
laws); (ii) non-Islamic companies, but which operate in Islamic-acceptable indus-
tries and have a low percentage of activities that conflict with Islamic Shariah;
and (iii) non-Islamic companies with a high percentage of activities that conflict
with Islamic Shariah. Alotaibi (2014) finds that a growing number of Islamic
individual and institutional investors adopt the strict Islamic screening strategy
on purely religious preferences. Further, he finds that many Islamic individual
and institutional investors question the Shariah compliance of the relaxed Islamic
screening strategy. Thus, this study follows the strict Islamic screening strategy
to define Islamic stocks.
5As mentioned previously, investors can directly distinguish between Islamic
and non-Islamic stocks in the GCC by observing the company article of associa-
tion. However, there are several lists available for Islamic investors in the GCC
(e.g., the Al-Mashora and Al-Raya for Islamic Financial Consultancy list and the
KFH Capital list).
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gorian calendar relative to the Islamic lunar calendar Hijri. The Is-
lamic lunar calendar has twelve months, Ramadan being the ninth
month: (1) Muharram, (2) Safar, (3) Rabia Awal, (4) Rabia Thani,
(5) Jumaada Awal, (6) Jumaada Thani, (7) Rajab, (8) Sha’ban, (9)
Ramadan, (10) Shawwal, (11) Dhul-Qi’dah, and (12) Dhul-Hijjah.
4.4 Methodology
4.4.1 Speculation-Level Tests
Volatility and idiosyncratic volatility tests
To test Hypothesis 1.a, we calculate a 17-day rolling volatility from
the daily returns of individual stocks using the Islamic calendar and
conduct mean and median equality tests.6 The mean equality test ex-
amines the equality of the time-series average of means for the stock’s
Ramadan daily volatility RV OL and the stock’s non-Ramadan (nor-
mal) daily volatility NV OL. The median equality test examines the
equality of the time-series median of means for the stock’s Ramadan
daily volatility RV OL and the stock’s non-Ramadan (normal) daily
volatility NV OL. To calculate a proxy for the stock normal volatility,
we use the non-Ramadan average volatility, omitting the immediate
6Following Ang et al. (2006), volatility can be defined as the standard deviation
of at least 17 daily returns.
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month before and after Ramadan to avoid contamination from recent
abnormal volatility (e.g., Pan et al. 2015).7
To test Hypothesis 1.b, we define idiosyncratic volatility as the
standard deviation of the residual estimated from the daily Fama &
French (1993) three-factor model (Ang et al. 2006). Thus, we first
calculate the daily Fama & French (1993) size (SMBd) and the book-
to-market (HMLd) return-mimicking portfolios, where SMBd is the
difference in return between the small and big market capitalization
portfolios in day d and HMLd is the difference in return between the
high and low book-to-market portfolios in day d. We rank all stocks
according to their market capitalization and use the 50th percentile
as the breakpoint between small and big portfolios. The book-to-
market breakpoints are the 30th and 70th percentile to generate high,
medium, and low book-to-market portfolios.
For each individual stock i, we calculate the idiosyncratic volatility
in terms of a 17-day rolling idiosyncratic volatility using the Islamic
calendar as follows:
ISVi,t =
(
1
D(t)
∑
d∈T (t)
ε2i,d
)1/2
, (4.1)
7The contamination effect may appear before Ramadan because Muslim reli-
giosity is expected to increase while preparing for Ramadan, and during Shawwaal
(the month after Ramadan) when Muslims are encouraged to fast six days of
Shawwaal.
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where T (t) is the set of trading days and D(t) is the number of trading
days in time (t) for the 17-day rolling idiosyncratic volatility, and εi,d
is the estimated residual from the Fama & French (1993) three-factor
model for stock i on day d. Finally, we conduct mean and median
equality tests. The mean equality test provides the equality of the
time-series average of means between Ramadan daily idiosyncratic
volatility RISV and the stock non-Ramadan (normal) daily idiosyn-
cratic volatility NISV . The median equality test gives the equal-
ity test of the time-series median of means between Ramadan daily
idiosyncratic volatility RISV and the stock non-Ramadan (normal)
daily idiosyncratic volatility NISV . To calculate the proxy of the
stock normal idiosyncratic volatility, we omit the immediate month
before and after Ramadan to avoid contamination from recent abnor-
mal volatility.
Trading frequency and liquidity tests
To test Hypothesis 1.c, we examine whether the average turnover ratio
TOV during Ramadan is lower than the rest of the year. The value
of TOV depends on individual stock-level data. Thus, we calculate
the daily turnover ratio for each stock as the trading volume for the
stock divided by the number of shares outstanding.8 We then conduct
8We note that the turnover ratio captures trading frequency but fails to account
for liquidity costs (Lesmond 2005, Summers 2000, Froot et al. 2001).
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mean and median equality tests for the Ramadan daily turnover ratio
RTOV and non-Ramadan (normal) turnover ratio NTOV . Again,
to avoid contamination when calculating the market non-Ramadan
turnover ratio NTOV , we omit the immediate month after and before
Ramadan.
Previous studies suggest no significant liquidity drop during Ra-
madan (Bia lkowski et al. 2012, Al-Ississ 2015). We extend the previ-
ous studies’ liquidity analysis by applying Amihud’s (2002) illiquidiy
ratio as an alternative liquidity proxy that better captures the liquid-
ity dimensions of emerging markets (Lesmond 2005). In particular,
we apply the market daily adjusted form of Amihud’s (2002) illiquidiy
ratio, LILi,d, as
9
LILi,d = log
(
1 +
|Rid|
V id
)
, (4.2)
where Rid is the return for stock i on day d and V
i
d is the trading volume
in local currency (in millions) for stock i on day d. The greater the
stock price response to change in volume, the greater the LILi,d.
4.4.2 Seasonality Returns Tests
Baltagi (2008) and Hsiao (2014) suggest that panel data regressions
mitigate the problems associated with estimation bias and multi-
9The LIL is as in Karolyi et al. (2012), for which they adjust Amihud’s (2002)
illiquidity measurement by adding a constant and calculating the log of the daily
illiquidity ratio, to reduce the influence of outliers.
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collinearity, controls for individual heterogeneity, and as well as spec-
ifying the time-varying relation between dependent and independent
variables. Thus, to examine whether Ramadan returns outperform
returns in other months and whether a drop in market volatility en-
hances risk-adjusted returns, we conduct panel data regressions. Be-
cause the data are pooled (panel), heteroskedasticity and autocorre-
lation may influence the OLS results. Thus, we include country and
industry dummies and use cluster-robust variance and covariance esti-
mators to provide more conservative standard errors (Arellano 2003).
Firstly, we test Hypothesis 2 by conducting a panel regression
using firm-level monthly returns data, including the dummy variables
for Ramadan:
Ri,t = α0 + α1D9i,t + εi,t, (4.3)
where Ri,t is the monthly return of stock i regressed on the dummy
variable for Ramadan; D9i,t is equal to 1 for the Ramadan month and
0 otherwise. Coefficient α1 indicates whether the Ramadan returns
outperform the returns of other months. For Hypothesis 2, the null
hypothesis is that α1 is zero.
Secondly, we test Hypothesis 3 to explore the effect of change in
the level of risk during Ramadan on returns. We conduct a panel re-
gression using firm-level monthly returns data, including the dummy
variables for Ramadan and controlling for market returns, firm-specific
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characteristics and speculation proxies (volatility or idiosyncratic volatil-
ity):
Ri,t = α0 + α1D9i,t + α2MRj,t−1 + βXi,t−1 + α3Si,t + εi,t, (4.4)
where Ri,t and D9i,t are as Equation (4.3). MRt−1 is the lag of the
monthly market return for stock market j. Xi,t−1 represent the lag of
firm-specific characteristic variables, including the log of the monthly
firm market capitalization in U.S. dollars, LSIZEi,t and the log of
the monthly stock market-to-book ratio, LMTBi,t. Si,t represent the
speculation proxies, either V OLi,t, the monthly volatility of stock i
returns for month t, or ISVi,t, the monthly idiosyncratic volatility of
stock i for month t. For Hypothesis 3, we hypothesize that a lower
return volatility and/or idiosyncratic volatility during Ramadan leads
to positive risk-adjusted returns. If this hypothesis holds, α1, the
coefficient of the Ramadan dummy variable D9 should be significantly
higher than the coefficient of D9 in Equation (4.3) after controlling
for speculation proxies (V OL or ISV ).
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 Speculation-Level Tests
Volatility and idiosyncratic volatility tests
From Hypotheses 1.a and 1.b, we expect a drop in stock market volatil-
ity and idiosyncratic volatility during Ramadan. In this section, we
report the results of testing these hypotheses using mean and median
equality tests.
Panel A of Table 4.3 shows the results of mean and median equality
tests for the daily volatility of Ramadan (RV OL) and market normal
volatility (NV OL) of non-Ramadan days (omitting the immediate
month before and after Ramadan to avoid contamination from recent
abnormal volatility). The results of the mean equality test, using
the adjusted p-values of the Satterthwaite-Welch (S-W) test which
corrects for unequal sample size and variances, suggest that all the
markets face a statistically significant drop in volatility during Ra-
madan compared to market normal volatility (at the 1% significance
level). Median equality tests suggest a statistically significant drop in
volatility for all markets during Ramadan compared to market nor-
mal volatility for all markets at the 1% significance level except Saudi
Arabia, which is at the 5% significance level.
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Panel B of Table 4.3 shows the results of mean and median equal-
ity tests for the daily idiosyncratic volatility of Ramadan (RISV )
and market normal idiosyncratic volatility (NISV ) of non-Ramadan
days (omitting the immediate month before and after Ramadan to
avoid contamination). The Satterthwaite-Welch (S-W) mean and the
median equality tests suggest a statistically significant drop in id-
iosyncratic volatility during Ramadan compared to market normal
idiosyncratic volatility in all markets (at the 1% significance level).10
Trading frequency and liquidity tests
Consistent with Hypothesis 1.c, we anticipate a drop in stock mar-
ket trading frequency during Ramadan. Figure 4.1 shows the time-
series average of means for stocks daily trading frequency using the
turnover ratio during Ramadan (RTOV ) compared to the rest of the
year (NTOV ). The figure clearly shows that all the markets in our
study face a lower average trading frequency during Ramadan com-
pared to the rest of the year, indicating a drop in stock market specu-
10It is important to note that our results are not caused by the change of trad-
ing hours during Ramadan, as only two out of six markets included in our study
reduced trading hours during Ramadan, namely Kuwait and Bahrain. However,
in results not reported here, we tested the impact of reduced trading hours in
Kuwait and Bahrain on the natural logarithm of trading volume using a general-
ized least-squares (GLS) estimation method (e.g., Datar et al. 1998) and including
an interactive dummy variable to capture the change of trading volume of Ra-
madan. The results indicate that there is no significant change in volume during
the Ramadan month. These results are available on request.
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Figure 4.1: Trading Frequency of Ramadan Vs. Non-Ramadan Days
lation during Ramadan. The figure also shows that the strongest drop
in trading frequency occurs in Saudi Arabia, which may reflect thin
institutional trading where individual trading represents around 89%
of total trading value in the Saudi stock market.11
Table 4.4 shows the results of mean and median equality tests for
daily trading frequency (turnover ratio) of Ramadan (RTOV ) and the
normal days average turnover ratio (NTOV ). The results of mean (S-
W) and median (MWW) equality tests in the table indicate a signif-
icant drop in Ramadan turnover ratio (RTOV ) for all markets, with
the exception of Bahrain at the mean test and Oman at both the
mean and median tests.
To ensure that our results are not biased by changes in market liq-
uidity, we conduct liquidity equality tests. Table 4.5 shows the results
of liquidity mean and median equality tests using an adjusted form of
11See, “Saudi Arabia Stock Report”, January 2015
(http://www.tadawul.com.sa).
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Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio. The results suggest that none of the
markets in our study face a drop in market liquidity during Ramadan
at the mean level, which is consistent with previous research findings
(Bia lkowski et al. 2012, Al-Ississ 2015). However, at the median level
only Saudi Arabia encounter a significant drop in stock market liquid-
ity during Ramadan, which may reflect that the Saudi stock market
lacks significant institutional trading, so that when individual trading
drops during Ramadan there is no significant institutional trading to
provide the market with liquidity.
4.5.2 Seasonality Returns Test
To examine whether Ramadan returns outperform returns in other
months and to determine whether a drop in market volatility enhances
risk-adjusted returns, we conduct a panel regression, starting with a
basic regression using a Ramadan dummy and then controlling for
market return, firm-specific characteristics, and speculation proxies
(volatility or idiosyncratic volatility).
Following Hypothesis 2, we expect that before controlling for spec-
ulation proxies, we encounter a positive significant regression coeffi-
cient for D9, the dummy variable of Ramadan. Following Hypothesis
3, we expect that controlling for speculation proxies, we will have a
more positive significant regression coefficient for D9. In other words,
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we expect the Ramadan month to outperform other months, allowing
for the drop in the level of stock volatility during Ramadan resulting
from a drop in speculation.
Panel A of Table 4.6 shows the results of our panel regressions
controlling for country and industry differences. The results suggest
that Ramadan return seasonality does not hold in the stocks of our
study without controlling for stock market volatility or idiosyncratic
volatility, leading us to reject Hypothesis 2. Further, we find a strong
significant positive risk-return Ramadan performance when control-
ling for stock speculation, which is associated with a significant coeffi-
cient of the speculation proxies (V OLi,t) and (ISVi,t). This supports
Hypothesis 3, which anticipates that a drop in stock market volatil-
ity during Ramadan leads to positive risk-adjusted return seasonality.
We derive similar conclusions when we control for changes in market
trends that may affect stock market seasonality using yearly dummy
variables as shown in Panel B of Table 4.6.
4.6 Further Tests: Islamic and Non-Islamic
Stock Differences
To further understand the effects of the speculative behavior of Mus-
lims on stock market outcomes, we repeat the previous tests, differ-
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entiating between Islamic and non-Islamic stocks. These tests allow
us to determine whether the same conclusions hold for Islamic and
non-Islamic stocks, and whether non-Islamic stocks show a more sig-
nificant drop relative to Islamic stocks in stock market speculation
(since religious Muslims trade only Islamic stocks and refrain from
speculative trading throughout the year, whereas less religious Mus-
lims trade non-Islamic stocks and refrain from speculation only during
Ramadan when their religiosity increases). We do not include Oman
in this analyses as it has only a small number and percentage of Is-
lamic listed companies (Table 4.2).
Panel A of Table 4.7 shows the mean and median equality test
results for Islamic stocks for Ramadan and market normal volatility.
The results of the mean (S-W) and the median (MWW) tests suggest
that all markets face a statistically significant drop in volatility during
Ramadan (with the exception of the Saudi Arabia median test). Panel
B of Table 4.7 shows the mean and median equality test results for
non-Islamic stocks for Ramadan and market normal volatility. The
results of the mean (S-W) and the median (MWW) tests suggest
that non-Islamic stocks face a statistically significant drop in market
volatility in all markets during Ramadan.
Panel A of Table 4.8 shows the mean and median equality test re-
sults for idiosyncratic volatility of Islamic stocks for the Ramadan days
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and non-Ramadan days. The results suggest that Islamic stocks in
all markets face a statistically significant drop in idiosyncratic volatil-
ity at the mean (S-W) and median (MWW) levels during Ramadan.
Panel B of Table 4.8 shows the mean and median equality test results
for non-Islamic stocks for Ramadan and market normal idiosyncratic
volatility. The results suggest that non-Islamic stocks in all markets
face a significant drop in idiosyncratic volatility at the mean (S-W)
and median (MWW) levels during Ramadan (at the 1% significance
level).
Panel A of Table 4.9 shows the mean and median equality test
results for the trading frequency of Islamic stocks for the Ramadan
days and non-Ramadan days. The results suggest that Islamic stocks
face a statistically significant drop in trading frequency at the mean
(S-W) and median (MWW) levels during Ramadan in all markets at
the 1% significance level (with the exception of the Bahrain mean test,
which is at the 5% significance level). Panel B of Table 4.9 shows the
mean and median equality test results for non-Islamic stocks for the
Ramadan and non-Ramadan (normal) trading frequency. The results
suggest that non-Islamic stocks face a statistically significant drop in
trading frequency during Ramadan in all markets at the mean (S-W)
and median (MWW) levels (with the exception of the Bahrain mean
test).
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Overall, our statistically significant results suggest a significant
drop in market volatility, idiosyncratic volatility, and trading fre-
quency during Ramadan for both Islamic and non-Islamic stocks, sup-
porting Hypotheses 1.a, 1.b, and 1.c, which is explained by increase
in Muslim religiosity during Ramadan leading to a reduction in stock
market speculation. Furthermore, most of our results show the drop
in speculation proxies to be stronger for non-Islamic stocks than for Is-
lamic stocks. We conclude that non-Islamic stocks are more sensitive
to changes in Muslim trading behavior than Islamic stocks. This prob-
ably reflects the fact that religious Muslims who follow Islamic trading
rules and trade only Islamic stocks refrain from speculative behavior
throughout the year, but less religious Muslims who trade non-Islamic
stocks refrain from speculation only during Ramadan when their reli-
giosity increases.
4.7 Robustness Test Using Index-Level
Data
As a further robustness, we use long-term indexes data (S&P) to test
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. We obtain the market S&P indexes daily
prices data from Thomson Datastream. These indexes have different
establishment dates, as shown in Table 4.10. To facilitate our tests,
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we convert the daily data based on the Gregorian calendar relative to
the Islamic lunar calendar Hijri.
The daily annualized returns for the Ramadan month and the rest
of the year are shown in Table 4.11 along with the equality of mean,
median, and variance test results. The mean and median equality
test results in Panels A and B of Table 4.11 suggest that none of
the markets exhibit significantly higher returns during the Ramadan
month compared to the rest of the year at both the mean and median
levels (except for UAE, which exhibits significantly higher returns
during Ramadan at the median level). The variance equality test
results in Panel C of Table 4.11 suggest that except for Qatar, all the
markets indicate a significantly lower standard deviation of returns
(volatility) during Ramadan.
4.7.1 Dummy Variables Test
For the classical dummy variables test, we follow Whyte & Picou
(1993) and Brooks & Persand (2001) and calculate the average monthly
continuous returns for each stock market index based on the Islamic
lunar calendar months. We then regress each index return separately
with 12 dummy variables representing the Islamic calendar months
from the establishment date to the end of 1435 Hijri (10/25/2014,
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Gregorian):
Rt = β1D1t + β2D2t + ...+ β12D12t + εt, (4.5)
where Rt is the average monthly continuous return; D1t, D2t,..., D12t
are the dummy variables representing the 12 Islamic calendar months
(D1t = 1 if month t is the first month in the Islamic calendar Muhar-
ram, zero otherwise, and so on); and εt is an iid error term. The co-
efficients β1–β12 represent the mean of the returns for the 12 months
of the Islamic calendar. A significant index return coefficient for the
ninth month of the Islamic calendar (Ramadan) supports the hypoth-
esis of Islamic calendar seasonality.
Table 4.12 displays the dummy variable regression test results.
The test results suggest no pronounced Ramadan effect in any mar-
ket (at the 10% or higher significance level). The results for all the
six markets considered are consistent with the findings of Almudhaf
(2012) who finds no Ramadan effect for the markets of our study with
the exception of Kuwait.
4.7.2 Risk-Adjusted Returns Test
Previous studies suggested a significant decline in return volatility
during Ramadan (Husain 1998, Seyyed et al. 2005, Bia lkowski et al.
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2012, Halari et al. 2015). Thus, we predict an increase in risk-adjusted
returns during Ramadan due to a drop in volatility.
The Sharpe Ratio measures the performance of an index by divid-
ing the average excess return to total risk, measured by the standard
deviation of returns.12 The Sharpe Ratio is calculated on a monthly
basis as:
SRit =
Rit −RF it
σit
, (4.6)
where Rit is the average continuous return for index i over month t,
RF it is the average risk-free rate for country i over month t, and σit
is the standard deviation of index i returns over month t.13
To test for the presence of a Ramadan effect in risk-adjusted re-
turns, we conduct the classical dummy variables test using the same
indexes data and monthly risk-adjusted returns (Sharpe Ratio). A
significant regression coefficient for D9, the dummy variable for the
ninth Hijri calendar month is required to support the hypothesis of
Ramadan risk-adjusted return seasonality.
Table 4.13 shows the dummy variable regression results with risk-
adjusted returns. The dummy variable test suggests a Ramadan effect
for four out of the six markets considered in our study: Kuwait, Oman,
12Previous studies have applied the Sharpe Ratio as a risk-adjusted method to
measure the performance of indexes (Hassan & Girard 2010, Ho et al. 2014).
13As with previous studies, we use a proxy for the risk-free rate (Hassan &
Girard 2010, Ho et al. 2014, Al-Khazali et al. 2014). Specifically, we use the
monthly discount rates of the local central banks.
96
Qatar, and UAE.
Finally, we consider risk-adjusted returns using idiosyncratic volatil-
ity calculated as monthly standard deviation of the errors of the cap-
ital asset pricing model (CAPM) (e.g., Boyer et al. 2010). Thus, we
measure the performance of an index by dividing the monthly aver-
age excess return by the monthly idiosyncratic risk. We then conduct
the classical dummy variables test using the same indexes data and
monthly idiosyncratic risk-adjusted returns.14
Table 4.14 shows the dummy variable regression results with idiosyncratic-
risk-adjusted returns. The results suggest that except for Bahrain,
all markets indicate significantly positive Ramadan idiosyncratic-risk-
adjusted returns.
4.8 Conclusion
Extant studies in the literature suggest that religiosity is negatively
related to investor speculation (e.g., Kumar 2009, Hilary & Hui 2009,
Kumar et al. 2011, Kumar & Page 2014). The question we address in
this chapter is whether the negative relation between investor specu-
lation and religiosity explains the phenomenon of stock market sea-
sonality based on religious events.
14For the CAPM market risk premium we use the returns of the FTSE All
World Index as a proxy for the market return.
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Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, from our
individual stocks data analysis of the GCC stock markets, we find
that these markets exhibit a lower level of speculation during the
Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Second, these markets show no Ra-
madan return seasonality when we do not control for the change in
risk due to the decline in speculation behavior. However, the sig-
nificant drop in stock market volatility and idiosyncratic volatility
during Ramadan leads to higher risk-adjusted returns. Third, our
analysis suggests that non-Islamic stocks encounter a more significant
drop in speculation during Ramadan relative to Islamic stocks. This
could be because Islamic stocks are traded by religious Muslims who
adopt Islamic trading rules and refrain from speculation all through
the year, but non-Islamic stocks are traded by less religious Muslims
who refrain from speculation only during Ramadan. An extension of
this analysis to test overall market speculation and return seasonality
using the stock market indexes data (S&P) gives consistent results.
We conclude that the Ramadan effect in previous studies is due to
a drop in stock market speculation, and not the outcome of positive
investor sentiment (as suggested by previous studies). During Ra-
madan, Muslims devote their time to religious practices and their re-
ligiosity increases. Thus, they speculate less, because excessive stock
market speculation is either forbidden or undesirable in Islam. We
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conclude that this behavior leads to lower market volatility, higher
risk-adjusted returns, and a more efficient market during Ramadan.
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Appendix I to Chapter 4: Tables
Table 4.1: Religious Indicators of the GCC Countries
This table presents the percentage of Muslims to total population and the total population in millions (from the 2011
PEW Research Center report “The Future of the Global Muslim Population”); and the religiosity index (form the
Gallup Survey as of 2009) for the GCC countries.
Country Muslims to Total Population Religiosity
Total Population (%) (million) Index (%)
Bahrain 81.2 1.26 94
Kuwait 86.4 2.74 91
Oman 85.2 2.78 -
Qatar 77.5 1.76 95
Saudi Arabia 97.1 27.45 93
UAE 76.0 7.51 91
Table 4.2: Stock Markets Description
This table presents the number of listed firms; the number of listed Islamic firms; and the percentage of Islamic firms
in the stock markets of our study as of December 31, 2014 (based on the list of Al-Mashora and Al-Raya for the Islamic
Financial Consultancy). The table also reports the total market capitalization as of December 31, 2014 for each stock
market in U.S. dollars (taken from Bloomberg).
Stock Number of Listed Islamic Percentage of Market Cap
Market Firms Firms Islamic Firms (%) in U.S.$ (000,000’)
Bahrain 48 11 23 21,893
Dubai 71 20 28 80,236
Kuwait 203 62 31 101,179
Oman 117 1 1 37,830
Qatar 43 10 23 154,065
Saudi Arabia 167 39 23 482,145
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Table 4.3: Market Volatility and Idiosyncratic Volatility Equality Tests
This table presents the volatility and idiosyncratic volatility mean and median equality tests from 2006 to 2014. The
mean is the time-series average of means and the median is the time-series median of means. Panel A gives the
equality tests for Ramadan daily volatility (RV OL) and non-Ramadan (normal) daily volatility (NV OL) (omitting
the immediate month before and after Ramadan). AV OL represents the abnormal volatility for Ramadan calculated
as (RV OL minus NV OL) scaled by RV OL. Panel B gives the mean and median equality tests for Ramadan daily
idiosyncratic volatility (RISV ) and non-Ramadan (normal) daily idiosyncratic volatility (NISV ) (again, omitting the
immediate month before and after Ramadan). AISV represents the abnormal idiosyncratic volatility for Ramadan
calculated as (RISV minus NISV ) scaled by RISV . The p-values of the (t-test) correspond to a standard test for
equality, the p-values of the (S-W) test correspond to a Satterthwaite-Welch test with correction for unequal sample
size and variances, and the p-values of the median equality test correspond to a Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney (MWW)
signed rank median test.
Panel A: Volatility Equality Tests
Mean Equality Test Median Equality Test
Stock Market
RVOL NVOL AVOL P-Value P-Value RVOL NVOL AVOL P-Value
(%) (%) (%) (t-test) (S-W) (%) (%) (%) (MWW)
Bahrain 1.21 2.62 -53.57 (0.20) (0.00) 0.76 0.90 -16.24 (0.00)
Dubai 1.50 1.87 -19.83 (0.00) (0.00) 1.32 1.59 -16.71 (0.00)
Kuwait 2.38 4.20 -43.32 (0.15) (0.00) 2.29 2.53 -9.23 (0.00)
Oman 1.97 2.34 -15.87 (0.00) (0.00) 1.78 2.07 -13.93 (0.00)
Qatar 1.67 2.01 -17.13 (0.00) (0.00) 1.57 1.81 -13.38 (0.00)
Saudi Arabia 2.31 2.65 -12.66 (0.00) (0.00) 2.09 2.14 -2.26 (0.04)
Panel B: Idiosyncratic Volatility Equality Tests
Mean Equality Test Median Equality Test
Stock Market
RISV NISV AISV P-Value P-Value RISV NISV AISV P-Value
(%) (%) (%) (t-test) (S-W) (%) (%) (%) (MWW)
Bahrain 1.66 4.80 -65.38 (0.14) (0.00) 0.93 1.10 -15.31 (0.00)
Dubai 1.60 2.08 -23.13 (0.00) (0.00) 1.40 1.73 -19.09 (0.00)
Kuwait 2.56 5.82 -56.07 (0.11) (0.00) 2.57 2.69 -4.20 (0.00)
Oman 1.81 2.28 -20.95 (0.00) (0.00) 1.74 1.95 -10.97 (0.00)
Qatar 1.45 1.80 -19.74 (0.00) (0.00) 1.31 1.72 -23.95 (0.00)
Saudi Arabia 1.87 2.09 -10.21 (0.00) (0.00) 1.61 1.89 -14.65 (0.00)
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Table 4.4: Market Trading Frequency Equality Tests
This table presents the trading frequency mean and median equality tests from 2006 to 2014 for the Ramadan turnover
ratio (RTOV ) and the other days’ normal turnover ratio (NTOV ) (omitting the immediate month before and after
Ramadan). The mean is the time-series average of means and the median is the time-series median of means. ATOV
represents the abnormal turnover ratio for Ramadan calculated as (RTOV minus NTOV ) scaled by RTOV . The
p-values of the (t-test) correspond to a standard test for equality, the p-values of the (S-W) test correspond to a
Satterthwaite-Welch test with correction for unequal sample size and variances, and the p-values of the median equality
test correspond to a Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney (MWW) signed rank median test.
Mean Equality Test Median Equality Test
Stock Market
RTOV NTOV ATOV P-Value P-Value RTOV NTOV ATOV P-Value
(%) (%) (%) (t-test) (S-W) (%) (%) (%) (MWW)
Bahrain 0.04 0.05 -14.95 (0.67) (0.65) 0.02 0.02 -31.67 (0.00)
Dubai 0.59 0.71 -16.03 (0.03) (0.01) 0.44 0.48 -9.74 (0.03)
Kuwait 0.38 0.52 -26.01 (0.00) (0.00) 0.34 0.45 -25.41 (0.00)
Oman 0.29 0.28 2.21 (0.83) (0.83) 0.14 0.18 -21.44 (0.28)
Qatar 0.23 0.32 -30.69 (0.00) (0.00) 0.19 0.26 -27.24 (0.00)
Saudi Arabia 4.12 6.30 -34.54 (0.02) (0.00) 1.62 3.06 -47.04 (0.00)
Table 4.5: Market Illiquidity Equality Tests
This table presents the mean and median equality tests for the Ramadan illiquidity ratio (RLIL) and the other days’
normal illiquidity ratio (NLIL) (omitting the immediate month before and after Ramadan to avoid contamination
from recent abnormal illiquidity) from 2006 to 2014. The mean is the time-series average of means and the median is
the time-series median of means. ALIL represents the abnormal illiquidity for Ramadan calculated as (RLIL minus
NLIL) scaled by RLIL. The p-values of the (t-test) correspond to a standard test for equality, the p-values of the
(S-W) test correspond to a Satterthwaite-Welch test with correction for unequal sample size and variances, and the
p-values of the median equality test correspond to a Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney (MWW) signed rank median test.
Median Equality Test Median Equality Test
Stock Market RLIL NLIL ALIL
P-Value P-Value
RLIL NLIL ALIL
P-Value
(t-test) (S-W) (MWW)
Bahrain 0.3707 0.4451 -0.17 (0.00) (0.00) 0.3556 0.4017 -0.11 (0.00)
Dubai 0.0941 0.0842 0.12 (0.32) (0.20) 0.0585 0.0553 0.06 (0.10)
Kuwait 0.3771 0.3649 0.03 (0.37) (0.39) 0.3407 0.3287 0.04 (0.52)
Oman 0.1822 0.2384 -0.24 (0.06) (0.02) 0.0741 0.0873 -0.15 (0.10)
Qatar 0.0464 0.0497 -0.07 (0.26) (0.18) 0.0397 0.0401 -0.01 (0.78)
Saudi Arabia 0.0022 0.0022 0.04 (0.95) (0.84) 0.0014 0.0010 0.46 (0.00)
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Table 4.6: Return Regression Tests
This table reports the panel regressions coefficients from 2006 to 2014. The dependent variable Ri,t is the monthly
return for stock i in month t. D9i,t is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the month is Ramadan and zero otherwise,
MRt is the monthly market return, LSIZEi,t is the log of the monthly firm market capitalization, LMTBi,t is the
log of the monthly stock market-to-book ratio, V OLi,t is the return volatility for stock i for the month t, and ISVi,t
is the idiosyncratic volatility for stock i for the month t. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses (accounting
for both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation). ***1 %; **5%; *10% denote significance levels.
Panel A: Including Country and Industry Dummies
α0 D9 MR LSIZE LMTB VOL ISV
(1) 0.0006 -0.0068
(0.0011) (0.0055)
(2) -0.0005 0.0000 0.9799
(0.0011) (0.0022) (0.9609)
(3) 0.0402 0.0015 0.9833 -0.0052
(0.0323) (0.0017) (0.9609) (0.0042)
(4) 0.0314 0.0018 0.9836 -0.0001 -0.0349
(0.0250) (0.0019) (0.9607) (0.0010) (0.0309)
(5) -0.0214*** 0.0011*** 0.0005 0.0017*** -0.0020*** 0.4015***
(0.0031) (0.0004) (0.0018) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0470)
(6) -0.0074** 0.0013* -0.0318** 0.0006* -0.0019*** 0.1997***
(0.0039) (0.0008) (0.0143) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0692)
Panel B: Including Country, Industry and Yearly Dummies
α0 D9 MR LSIZE LMTB VOL ISV
(1) 2.7798 -0.0068
(2.8225) (0.0056)
(2) -0.0513 0.0000 0.9968
(0.4804) (0.0022) (0.9609)
(3) 0.1120 0.0015 0.9833 -0.0052
(0.4955) (0.0017) (0.9609) (0.0042)
(4) 5.132 0.0021 0.9833 0.0000 -0.0038
(4.845) (0.0019) (0.9609) (0.0012) (0.0343)
(5) -0.9352*** 0.0011*** 0.0012 0.0019*** -0.0016*** 0.4001***
(0.1277) (0.0004) (0.0018) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0463)
(6) -0.6687*** 0.0013* -0.0318** 0.0004* -0.0018*** 0.1999***
(0.1482) (0.0008) (0.0142) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0692)
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Table 4.7: Islamic and Non-Islamic Stocks Volatility Equality Tests
This table presents the mean and median equality tests for Ramadan daily volatility (RV OL) and non-Ramadan
(normal) daily volatility (NV OL) (omitting the immediate month before and after Ramadan) for both Islamic and
non-Islamic stocks from 2006 to 2014. The mean is the time-series average of means and the median is the time-series
median of means. AV OL represents the abnormal volatility for Ramadan calculated as (RV OL minus NV OL) scaled
by RV OL. The p-values of the (t-test) correspond to a standard test for equality, the p-values of the (S-W) test
correspond to a Satterthwaite-Welch test with correction for unequal sample size and variances, and the p-values of
the median equality test correspond to a Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney (MWW) signed rank median test.
Panel A: Islamic Stocks Volatility Tests
Mean Equality Test Median Equality Test
Stock Market
RVOL NVOL AVOL P-Value P-Value RVOL NVOL AVOL P-Value
(%) (%) (%) (t-test) (S-W) (%) (%) (%) (MWW)
Bahrain 0.96 10.88 -91.17 (0.14) (0.00) 1.03 1.23 -16.12 (0.00)
Dubai 2.04 2.46 -16.78 (0.00) (0.00) 1.67 2.10 -20.45 (0.00)
Kuwait 2.70 2.92 -7.30 (0.00) (0.00) 2.67 2.74 -2.57 (0.00)
Qatar 1.81 2.13 -15.11 (0.00) (0.00) 1.57 1.86 -15.59 (0.00)
Saudi Arabia 2.46 2.73 -9.90 (0.01) (0.00) 2.37 2.33 1.43 (0.30)
Panel B: Non-Islamic Stocks Volatility Tests
Mean Equality Test Median Equality Test
Stock Market
RVOL NVOL AVOL P-Value P-Value RVOL NVOL AVOL P-Value
(%) (%) (%) (t-test) (S-W) (%) (%) (%) (MWW)
Bahrain 1.26 0.97 30.05 (0.00) (0.08) 0.70 0.77 -9.42 (0.00)
Dubai 1.29 1.67 -22.76 (0.00) (0.00) 1.06 1.36 -22.17 (0.00)
Kuwait 2.32 5.68 -59.14 (0.19) (0.00) 2.20 2.50 -11.87 (0.00)
Qatar 1.63 1.98 -17.67 (0.00) (0.00) 1.48 1.80 -17.96 (0.00)
Saudi Arabia 2.16 2.52 -14.29 (0.00) (0.00) 1.86 2.00 -6.88 (0.00)
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Table 4.8: Islamic and Non-Islamic Stocks Idiosyncratic Volatility Equality Tests
This table presents the mean and median equality tests for Ramadan daily idiosyncratic volatility (RISV ) and non-
Ramadan (normal) daily idiosyncratic volatility (NISV ) (omitting the immediate month before and after Ramadan)
for both Islamic and non-Islamic stocks from 2006 to 2014. The mean is the time-series average of means and the
median is the time-series median of means. AISV represents abnormal idiosyncratic volatility for Ramadan calculated
as (RISV minus NISV ) scaled by RISV . The p-values of the (t-test) correspond to a standard test for equality,
the p-values of the (S-W) test correspond to a Satterthwaite-Welch test with correction for unequal sample size and
variances, and the p-values of the median equality test correspond to a Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney (MWW) signed rank
median test.
Panel A: Islamic Stocks Idiosyncratic Volatility Tests
Mean Equality Test Median Equality Test
Stock Market
RISV NISV AISV P-Value P-Value RISV NISV AISV P-Value
(%) (%) (%) (t-test) (S-W) (%) (%) (%) (MWW)
Bahrain 1.49 13.33 -88.79 (0.10) (0.00) 1.21 1.44 -15.59 (0.00)
Dubai 1.84 2.29 -19.64 (0.00) (0.00) 1.69 2.02 -15.99 (0.00)
Kuwait 2.88 4.23 -31.97 (0.09) (0.00) 2.92 2.92 -0.03 (0.04)
Qatar 1.41 1.81 -22.18 (0.00) (0.00) 1.30 1.64 -20.75 (0.00)
Saudi Arabia 1.97 2.09 -5.91 (0.03) (0.01) 1.93 1.96 -1.82 (0.08)
Panel B: Non-Islamic Stocks Idiosyncratic Volatility Tests
Mean Equality Test Median Equality Test
Stock Market
RISV NISV AISV P-Value P-Value RISV NISV AISV P-Value
(%) (%) (%) (t-test) (S-W) (%) (%) (%) (MWW)
Bahrain 1.69 3.06 -44.80 (0.22) (0.00) 0.89 0.99 -10.54 (0.00)
Dubai 1.50 2.00 -24.98 (0.00) (0.00) 1.31 1.59 -17.41 (0.00)
Kuwait 2.46 7.57 -67.51 (0.13) (0.00) 2.34 2.62 -10.46 (0.00)
Qatar 1.45 1.91 -23.86 (0.00) (0.00) 1.37 1.73 -21.22 (0.00)
Saudi Arabia 1.77 2.00 -11.54 (0.00) (0.00) 1.46 1.74 -16.15 (0.00)
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Table 4.9: Islamic and Non-Islamic Stocks Trading Frequency Equality Tests
This table presents the mean and median equality tests for Ramadan trading frequency (RTOV ) and the other days’
market normal trading frequency (NTOV ) (omitting the immediate month before and after Ramadan) for both Islamic
and non-Islamic stocks from 2006 to 2014. The mean is the time-series average of means and the median is the time-
series median of means. ATOV represents the abnormal trading frequency for Ramadan calculated as (RTOV minus
NTOV ) scaled by RTOV . The p-values of the (t-test) correspond to a standard test for equality, the p-values of the
(S-W) test correspond to a Satterthwaite-Welch test with correction for unequal sample size and variances, and the
p-values of the median equality test correspond to a Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney (MWW) signed rank median test.
Panel A: Islamic Stocks Trading Frequency Tests
Mean Equality Test Median Equality Test
Stock Market
RTOV NTOV ATOV P-Value P-Value RTOV NTOV ATOV P-Value
(%) (%) (%) (t-test) (S-W) (%) (%) (%) (MWW)
Bahrain 0.03 0.05 -46.97 (0.40) (0.04) 0.01 0.02 -44.86 (0.00)
Dubai 0.64 0.87 -25.76 (0.01) (0.00) 0.41 0.49 -16.70 (0.00)
Kuwait 0.44 0.63 -29.64 (0.00) (0.00) 0.37 0.54 -32.10 (0.00)
Qatar 0.32 0.45 -29.23 (0.00) (0.00) 0.18 0.30 -38.29 (0.00)
Saudi Arabia 2.14 3.72 -42.60 (0.00) (0.00) 1.77 3.07 -42.28 (0.00)
Panel B: Non-Islamic Stocks Trading Frequency Tests
Mean Equality Test Median Equality Test
Stock Market
RTOV NTOV ATOV P-Value P-Value RTOV NTOV ATOV P-Value
(%) (%) (%) (t-test) (S-W) (%) (%) (%) (MWW)
Bahrain 0.04 0.05 -14.12 (0.73) (0.68) 0.01 0.02 -30.57 (0.00)
Dubai 0.55 0.62 -11.13 (0.10) (0.07) 0.40 0.45 -9.75 (0.02)
Kuwait 0.27 0.44 -40.03 (0.00) (0.00) 0.23 0.36 -34.95 (0.00)
Qatar 0.20 0.29 -31.44 (0.00) (0.00) 0.12 0.22 -44.43 (0.00)
Saudi Arabia 1.80 3.24 -44.51 (0.00) (0.00) 1.11 2.03 -45.51 (0.00)
Table 4.10: Establishment Dates for the S&P Indexes
This table presents the establishment dates for each S&P index following both the Gregorian and Islamic Lunar (Hijri)
calendars and the number of Ramadan months available in our data for each index from the establishment date to
October 25, 2014 Gregorian (12/30/1435 Hijri).
Establishment Date Establishment Date Number of Ramadan
(Gregorian) (Islamic Lunar) Observations
Bahrain 01/05/2000 26/01/1421 14
Kuwait 03/01/2005 22/11/1425 9
Oman 19/04/2000 14/01/1421 14
Qatar 31/12/2004 19/11/1425 9
Saudi Arabia 31/12/1997 02/09/1418 17
UAE 03/01/2005 22/11/1425 9
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Table 4.11: Summary Statistics and Equality Tests of the Annualized Index Returns
This table presents the summary statistics and equality tests of the annualized daily index returns in percentage, based
on the Islamic 12-month lunar calendar from each index establishment date to October 25, 2014 Gregorian (12/30/1435
Hijri). Ramadan days are the days of the ninth month of the Islamic lunar calendar. The p-values of the median
equality test in Panel B correspond to a Wilcoxon/MannWhitney (MWW) signed rank median test. The p-values of
the variance equality test in Panel C correspond to the F-test and Bartlett-test. A Bartlett-test compares the weighted
average variance logarithm and the weighted sum of the variance logarithms (for further details, see Sokal et al. 1969).
Panel A: Mean Equality Test
Ramadan Days Rest of the Year P-Value
(%) (%) (t-test)
Bahrain 3.38 44.08 (0.77)
Kuwait 22.32 -2.63 (0.42)
Oman 13.92 8.68 (0.80)
Qatar 34.18 7.88 (0.48)
Saudi Arabia 21.14 9.68 (0.69)
UAE 61.10 -1.04 (0.13)
Panel B: Median Equality Test
Ramadan Days Rest of the Year P-Value
(%) (%) (MWW)
Bahrain 2.49 2.78 (0.92)
Kuwait 35.04 5.79 (0.17)
Oman 28.18 12.03 (0.32)
Qatar 50.00 19.75 (0.28)
Saudi Arabia 22.45 26.53 (0.53)
UAE 79.72 18.19 (0.02)
Panel C: Variance Equality Test
Ramadan Days Rest of Days P-Value P-Value
St. dev. St. dev. (F-test) (Bartlett)
Bahrain 2.13 22.18 (0.00) (0.00)
Kuwait 3.08 3.74 (0.00) (0.00)
Oman 2.60 3.05 (0.00) (0.00)
Qatar 4.81 4.58 (0.43) (0.40)
Saudi Arabia 3.64 4.41 (0.00) (0.00)
UAE 4.60 5.12 (0.05) (0.07)
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Appendix II to Chapter 4: Summary of
Main Previous Studies
This appendix consists of summaries for the related Ramadan re-
turn seasonality studies. Table 4.15 reports several aspects of the
reviewed studies, including their aims, data length, data type, econo-
metric techniques used, and main findings.
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Table 4.15: Related Studies of Ramadan Effect
Study
(Authors
& Date)
Aims Sample & Period Data Type
Econometric
Techniques
Main Findings
Husain
(1998)
To explore
Ramadan effect
 Pakistani Equity
Market: 1989–1992
36 individual
stocks, 8 sector
indexes, and
general index
 GARCH
Significant decline
in stock market
returns volatility
during Ramadan
without significant
change in returns
Seyyed
et al. (2005)
To examine the
effect of Ramadan
on weekly stock
returns and
volatility
 Saudi Arabia Stock
Market: 1985–1999
General market
index and 6 sector
indexes
 GARCH
Significant decline
in stock market
returns volatility
during Ramadan
without significant
change in returns
Al-Hajieh
et al. (2011)
To examine
whether Ramadan
is reflected in
positive calendar
anomalies in
Islamic Middle
Eastern stock
markets
 Bahrain: 1996–2007
 Egypt: 1998–2007
 Jordan and Turkey:
1992–2007
 Kuwait: 2001–2007
 Qatar and UAE:
2005–2007
 Saudi Arabia:
1994–2007
Local market
indexes
 Wald-Wolfowitz
runs test; country
level analysis
Significant positive
returns in
Ramadan in 6 of
the 8 countries
Almudhaf
(2012)
To investigate the
Islamic calendar
seasonal
anomalies in the
stock returns of
12 countries with
Muslim majority
 Bahrain and Oman:
2001–2007
 Egypt, Indonesia,
Jordan, Malaysia,
Morocco, Pakistan,
and Turkey:
1996–2007
 Kuwait: 1997–2007
 Saudi Arabia:
1998–2007
 UAE: 2004–2007
S&P indexes
except for Kuwait
Dow Jones 50 and
UAE Dubai
Financial Market
index
 Dummy
variables test;
country level
analysis
Ramadan has
higher returns only
in 4 of the 12
tested countries,
including Jordan,
Kuwait, Pakistan,
and Turkey
Bia lkowski
et al. (2012)
To investigate
stock returns
during Ramadan
for 14
predominantly
Muslim countries
 Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, and UAE:
2005–2007
 Egypt, Morocco,
and Turkey:
1994–2007
 Indonesia, Jordan,
and Malaysia:
1987–2007
 Pakistan:
1992–2007
 Tunisia: 2004–2007
MSCI indexes
 CARs using
t-test adjusting
for risk; pooling
all countries in
one analysis
Strong evidence for
Ramadan positive
returns seasonality
in long and
sub-periods
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Table 4.15 (continued)
Study
(Authors
& Date)
Aims Sample & Period Data Type
Econometric
Techniques
Main Findings
Al-Khazali
(2014)
To examine the
effect of Ramadan
on investor
psychology and
investment
decisions
 Bahrain: 1995–2012
 Egypt, Indonesia,
Jordan, Kuwait,
Malaysia, Morocco,
Pakistan, Saudi,
Tunisia, and Turkey:
1989–2012
 Oman, Qatar, and
Dubai: 2000–2012
 Abu Dhabi:
2001–2012
Local stock
market indexes
 Stochastic
dominance (SD);
country level
analysis
Weak Ramadan
returns seasonality
for all countries in
the long period
(1989–2012);
however, Ramadan
positive returns
seasonality exists in
most countries in
the sub-periods
(1996–2000,
20012006, and
1995–2007), and
diminishes during
the global financial
crisis period
2007–2012
Halari et al.
(2015)
To explore Islamic
calendar
anomalies
 Pakistan:
1995–2011
Stock-level data
for 106 companies
listed on the
Karachi Stock
Exchange (KSE)
 Threshold
GARCH
Return volatility in
Ramadan is lower
than in other
months of the
Islamic calendar
Al-Ississ
(2015)
To investigate the
holiday effect
 Egypt and Morocco:
1995–2012
 Indonesia:
1988–2012
 Jordan: 1993–2012
 Kuwait: 1999–2012
 Malaysia:
1985–2012
 Pakistan:
1992–2012
 Qatar: 2002–2012
 Saudi Arabia:
2000–2012
 Turkey: 1989–2012
Stock-level
 Panel
regression;
pooling all
countries in one
analysis
Positive change in
stock returns
during Ramadan
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Chapter 5
Deviation from Religious Beliefs
5.1 Introduction
The propensity to take on risk as a function of potential reward can
be influenced by religious beliefs, leading to investor heterogeneity,
which provides explanations for phenomena that cannot be explained
by classical finance theory (Doran et al. 2011). For example, hetero-
geneity in gambling preferences suggests an explanation for the diver-
sification puzzle (Statman 2004) and predicts investor preference to
hold stocks with high skewness and volatility (Kumar et al. 2011), as
well as explaining the negative relationship between expected returns
and idiosyncratic volatility (Boyer et al. 2010).
Recent developments in finance literature have considered the in-
fluence of religion on preferences to hold gambling (lottery-type) stocks
(Kumar 2009, Kumar et al. 2011, Kumar & Page 2014). They define
lottery-type stocks as those with high skewness and volatility Bar-
beris & Huang (2008). Previous studies have relied on divergence in
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Christian cultures to test the implication of religion on stock market
gambling behavior (Kumar 2009, Kumar et al. 2011, Kumar & Page
2014). This Christian sample suffers from a low level of religiosity,1
unclear Christian investing rules, and a lack of clear identity as to
institutional religious background.2
Motivated by the theoretical frameworks of Barberis & Huang
(2008), our study aims to contribute to the literature that considers
the influence of religious background on the preference to hold lottery-
type stocks (Kumar 2009, Kumar et al. 2011, Kumar & Page 2014).
To this end, we take advantage of an economy/market (Kuwait) in
1The World Values Survey (2010–2014) shows that countries that are used to
examine the influence of religious background on financial decisions have a low
percentage of people who believe that religion is very important in life (e.g., Aus-
tralia 14.1%, Germany 13.1%, Netherlands 10.6%, and U.S. 40.4%). This low level
of religiosity leads to unclear conclusions on the influence of religious background
on financial decisions. For example, studies on risk-aversion among Christian de-
nominations are inconsistent (Noussair et al. 2013). While some authors suggest
that Protestants are less risk tolerant than are Catholics (Barsky et al. 1997, Ku-
mar 2009, Benjamin et al. 2016, Kumar et al. 2011), other researchers report the
opposite result (Dohmen et al. 2011, Renneboog & Spaenjers 2012, Ko¨brich Leon
& Pfeifer 2013).
2The literature on the testing of the relationship between speculation (gam-
bling) attitudes and Christian religious environment exhibits difficulty in distin-
guishing investors’ religious backgrounds. Previous studies at the institutional
level have combined the concentration of geographical religious groups and insti-
tutional historical portfolio holdings as indicators of institution religious identity
and risk-aversion. The first proxy of geographical location and residency of reli-
gious groups provides some indication of the institution religious environment that
has been used as a proxy for institution religious background (e.g., Kumar 2009,
Hilary & Hui 2009, Kumar et al. 2011, Kumar & Page 2014). A second proxy
is the historical institutional portfolio weight of lottery-type stocks, which also
provides some indication of institutional traders’ willingness to hold lottery-type
stocks, and distinguishes between gambling-tolerant and gambling-averse institu-
tions (Kumar & Page 2014).
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which society is strongly influenced by religious norms. The level of
religiosity in our study is higher than that in previous studies. Ac-
cording to the World Values Survey (2010–2014), the level of religios-
ity in Kuwait is 86.5%, which is much higher than for samples that
have been used in the previous studies in the U.S. (40.4%). Further-
more, investors in our data from an Islamic society (Kuwait) have
clear norms that prohibit/discourage excessive stock market specula-
tion (Kamali 1996, Ahmed 2000, Naughton & Naughton 2000, Zaher
& Kabir Hassan 2001, Al-Masri 2007). Finally, our study avoids the
problem of previous studies, which is the lack of identification of insti-
tutional traders’ religious identity. In contrast to previous studies that
use geographical clustering of religious groups and historical portfo-
lio holdings as indirect indicators of institutional investors’ religious
background, our measure is substantially more direct. We are able
to clearly distinguish between religious and non-religious institutional
investors by their article of association, which clearly distinguishes Is-
lamic institutional investors as those companies or funds that conduct
their regulated activities in compliance with Islamic Shariah.
In this setting, we examine the influence of institutional investors’
religious background on owning lottery-type stocks (Kumar 2009, Ku-
mar et al. 2011). In addition, we test the conjecture of Kumar & Page
(2014) that gambling-averse institutional investors deviate from their
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religious norms when they have significant information and the poten-
tial benefit is high. Specifically, we compare the returns of lottery-type
stocks of Islamic and non-Islamic institutional portfolios to examine
whether violations of norms predict the performance of institutional
investors’ holdings.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine the
effect of religious norms (against gambling) on the preference to hold
lottery-type stocks in an Islamic context. Our main results can be
summarized as follows. In contrast with our expectation, we find that
Islamic institutional investors hold more lottery-type stocks in their
portfolios than do non-Islamic institutional investors. This deviation
from Islamic norms may be due to Islamic institutional traders having
stronger information signals that induce them to trade risky gambling
stocks with high skewness. Our analysis suggests that lottery-type
stocks held by Islamic institutional investors earn on average 0.06%
per month higher than do lottery-type stocks held by non-Islamic in-
stitutional investors (t-statistic = 2.48). Finally, our analysis suggests
that as the percentage of non-Islamic institutional ownership increases
in Islamic stocks, they exhibit lower lottery-type stock characteristics.
The implications of our study are, therefore, important for regulators
and Islamic Shariah auditors in countries that have institutions oper-
ating in compliance with Islamic Shariah. We suggest that regulators
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and Islamic Shariah auditors may need to more effectively regulate
to ensure that the operations of Islamic institutions are free from ex-
cessive uncertainty (Gharar), in the same way that they ensure that
their transactions are free from interest (Riba).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2
presents the background to the study together with the hypotheses
development. Section 5.3 presents the research methodology. Section
5.4 presents the data. Section 5.5 provides empirical results. Section
5.6 concludes.
5.2 Background and Hypotheses Devel-
opment
5.2.1 Background
Islamic Shariah has set in place a number of norms and ethical codes
to safeguard against unfair activities (Taj el din 1996). From the
perspective of Islamic Shariah, many practices in traditional stock
exchanges are undesirable, such as speculation and volatility in share
prices, which are not connected to economic value or to the underlying
performance of companies. Stock market trading is allowed under
Islamic laws, but speculation in stock exchanges is either undesirable
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or forbidden. In Islam, excessive speculation is forbidden because it
involves high uncertainty (Gharar) and is similar to gambling, which is
strictly forbidden in the Quran (Kamali 1996, Ahmed 2000, Naughton
& Naughton 2000, Zaher & Kabir Hassan 2001, Al-Masri 2007).
Religious trading rules lead to variation of the acceptance of gam-
bling among investors with different religions and different levels of
religiosity, which leads to heterogeneity in speculative behavior.3 A
number of studies relate such heterogeneity in gambling acceptance
to heterogeneity in preferences for holding lottery-type stocks (Kumar
2009, Kumar et al. 2011, Doran et al. 2011, Kumar & Page 2014).4
A religious environment can influence professional behavior, per-
sonal behavior, and institutional constraints. The interaction be-
tween religious background and financial decision-making has been
addressed at both the individual and institutional level. Previous
3For instance, the Catholic Church has been considered more tolerant about
gambling than is the Protestant Church (Kumar et al. 2011). Muslims have a
clearer prohibition for risky financial behavior than do Christians (Kunhibava
2011).
4Alternative definitions for lottery-type stocks are encountered in finance lit-
erature. Lottery-type stocks have been defined by Kumar (2009) as those with
lottery ticket characteristics. Lottery tickets have a low price with a low probabil-
ity of a very large return. Thus, lottery-type stocks can be defined as stocks with
low price and high idiosyncratic volatility and skewness. Other studies use similar
properties to define lottery-type stocks (such as Boyer et al. 2010, Doran et al.
2011, Kumar & Page 2014). Kumar et al. (2011) use the same definition with-
out the price characteristic to test institutional traders’ gambling attitudes. They
determine similar qualitative outcomes when they include the price characteris-
tic in their definition of lottery-type stocks. Bali et al. (2011) use an alternative
definition for lottery-type stocks based on an extreme returns criterion using the
maximum daily return of each security during the previous month.
118
studies apply demographic religious proxies to conduct research at
the individual and institutional levels (Kumar 2009, Hilary & Hui
2009, Kumar et al. 2011, Kumar & Page 2014). For example, Ku-
mar et al. (2011) use a Catholic-to-Protestant ratio in U.S. counties
as a proxy for gambling preference to test the relationship between
the geographical variations of religious tendency and gambling atti-
tudes in the stock market at the institutional level.5 Their findings
suggest that religious background can affect gambling attitudes (pref-
erence of holding lottery-type stocks) at the institutional level, with
firms located in high Protestant areas being more averse to holding
lottery-type stocks than are those located in high Catholic areas.
5.2.2 Hypotheses Development
Notwithstanding the difficulty in measuring traders’ preferences for
gambling and speculation directly, the role of gambling has been con-
sidered in finance literature. Kumar et al. (2011) find evidence of the
effect of gambling attitudes on the financial decisions of institutional
5The difference in gambling acceptance between religions may cause hetero-
geneity in investors’ gambling preferences. Kumar (2009) uses religious groups as
an explanation of the preference to hold lottery-type stocks. He finds that lottery-
type stocks and state lotteries attract similar religious groups. He also finds that
people who live in a Catholic geographic area have a preference to hold lottery
type-stocks compared with those living in Protestant geographic areas, and that
people who live in geographic areas without any strong religious background have
higher preference for lottery-type stocks. His results are consistent with the liter-
ature that finds that Catholics participate in lotteries more than do Protestants
(e.g., Grichting 1986).
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investors in relation to the geographical variation of religious tendency,
captured by the ratio of Catholics to Protestants (CPRATIO) to ex-
plain the effect of gambling norms on stock market outcomes.6 They
build their conjectures based on sophisticated institutional investors,
while arguing that less sophisticated investors may deviate from their
norms because of behavioral biases.
However, the role of gambling has not been considered in the ex-
tant finance literature in an Islamic context. In the stock markets
of Islamic societies, where Islamic and non-Islamic stocks and traders
are present in the same exchange, we may clearly differentiate between
gambling-tolerant and gambling-averse institutional traders. Islamic
institutions in these markets are subject to Islamic norms, which arise
from Islamic Shariah that forbids excessive speculation as it involves
Gharar and is similar to gambling, which is strictly forbidden in the
Quran. Thus, we categorize Islamic institutions as gambling-averse
and non-Islamic institutions as gambling-tolerant.
Traders’ variation in norms against gambling predict their pref-
erence for holding lottery-type stocks (Kumar et al. 2011).7 Since
excessive stock market speculation (gambling) is prohibited in Islam,
6In the case that religious background determines gambling preference, the
Catholic Church is considered more tolerant with regard to gambling than is the
Protestant Church (Kumar et al. 2011).
7A detailed summary of the studies that have been referenced in this chapter
with regard to lotter-type stocks is presented in Table 5.9 in Appendix II to this
chapter.
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we expect that Islamic institutions have a lower preference for owning
lottery-type stocks than do non-Islamic institutions, which leads us
to propose the following:
Hypothesis 1: Islamic institutional traders are more averse to own-
ing lottery-type (gambling) stocks than are non-Islamic institutional
traders.
If investors have access to private information, norms against hold-
ing certain types of stocks are expected to influence the decision to
take advantage of that information. However, if the information is
powerful and the benefit is expected to be sufficient, sophisticated
investors might be expected to deviate from their norms (Kumar
& Page 2014, Huang et al. 2014). The findings of Kumar & Page
(2014) and Huang et al. (2014) are consistent with the conjuncture
that “gambling-averse” institutional investors outperform those that
are “gambling-tolerant” when the former invest against their norms
in lottery-type stocks. Thus, we expect that:
Hypothesis 2: “Lottery-type” stocks owned by Islamic institutional
traders outperform those owned by non-Islamic institutional traders.
Islamic institutional traders are expected to speculate less than are
non-Islamic institutional traders. For most Islamic countries, specu-
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lation is not legally controlled. Nevertheless, we expect that if Islamic
institutional traders preserve their Islamic norms, they will speculate
less than do non-Islamic institutional traders. For instance, in the case
of the KSE, although there is no legal control on stock market spec-
ulation, Islamic firms must have an internal Shariah audit committee
to ensure that the transactions of the Islamic institution are in com-
pliance with Shariah rules. We expect that the internal Shariah audit
committees control firms’ excessive speculation activities, as these ac-
tivities are prohibited in Islam.
Consistent with our hypothesis that Islamic stock market traders
are expected to be more gambling-averse than are non-Islamic traders,
we expect Islamic stocks to have less lottery-type characteristics than
do non-Islamic stocks. However, if non-Islamic (gambling-tolerant)
traders speculate on Islamic stocks, they may create lottery-type Is-
lamic stocks. Observing the ownership structure of Islamic stocks, we
expect that Islamic stocks with high non-Islamic ownership will have
higher lottery characteristics. In other words, gambling-tolerant (non-
Islamic institutional) traders create “lottery-type Islamic stocks”. This
leads us to propose the following:
Hypothesis 3: Islamic stocks are more likely to exhibit lottery-type
characteristics as ownership of non-Islamic institutions increases in
them.
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5.3 Research Methodology
5.3.1 Measuring Lottery-Type Stocks
We define lottery-type stocks, following Kumar & Page (2014), as
those with lottery ticket characteristics, these being stocks in the high-
est quantile of expected idiosyncratic skewness (EISS ).
The key predictors of idiosyncratic skewness in our model are firm
size, turnover, lagged idiosyncratic skewness, and idiosyncratic volatil-
ity. For each individual stock, we calculate the end of the month t
idiosyncratic volatility and skewness using data from the previous six
months. We follow Boyer et al. (2010) and Kumar (2009) in calculat-
ing idiosyncratic volatility “ISVi,t”:
ISVi,t =
(
1
D(t)
∑
d∈T (t)
ε2i,d
)1/2
, (5.1)
where T (t) is the set of trading days in the previous six months, D(t)
is the number of trading days in the previous six months set T (t), and
εi,d is the estimated residual from the Fama & French (1993) three-
factor model for stock i on day d, using the time series of the daily
stock returns over the previous six months T (t).
123
To calculate idiosyncratic skewness ISS, we follow Boyer et al.
(2010) and Kumar (2009):
ISSi,t =
1
D(t)
∑
d∈T (t)
ε3i,d
ISV 3i,t
, (5.2)
where εi,d is the estimated residual from the three-factor model for
stock i on day d over T (t), and ISVi,t is the idiosyncratic volatility
calculated as Equation (5.1).
Historical skewness measures suffer from instability (Harvey &
Siddique 2000). Further, Kumar & Page (2014) argue that sophis-
ticated investors’ gambling decisions are derived in relation to esti-
mated, rather than historical, skewness. Thus, in our study, we follow
Boyer et al. (2010) and Kumar & Page (2014) and estimate the ex-
pected idiosyncratic skewness (EISS ) by first estimating, at the end
of each month t, separate cross-sectional regressions:8
ISSi,t = β0,t+β1,t−T ISSi,t−T +β2,t−T ISVi,t−T +λ
′
tXi,t−T +εi,t, (5.3)
where Xi,t−T are the firm-specific variables vector observed at the
end of each month t − T , including turnover (TOVi,t−T ), momentum
(MOMi,t−T ), firm size LSIZEi,t−T , and industry dummy variables.
8This regression is similar to Chen et al.’s (2001) panel estimation, with the
difference being that we follow Boyer et al. (2010) and Kumar (2009) by estimating
the model separately at the end of each month.
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The TOVi,t−T is the daily average share turnover of the firm during
months t− T − 2 through t− T . The MOMi,t−T is calculated as the
stock i cumulative return over the months t − T − 12 to t − T − 1.
LSIZEi, t− T is the firm log of the market capitalization.
We estimate monthly coefficients from the above regression and use
these estimates with the current values of firm-specific variables to pre-
dict the expected idiosyncratic skewness for the following month. We
calculate this skewness on a monthly basis based on the information
available at the time, to produce monthly stock-by-stock measures of
expected skewness, using the following equation:
EISSi,t = β0,t + β1,tISSi,t + β2,tISVi,t + λ
′
tXi,t. (5.4)
5.3.2 Identifying Institutional Investors’ Religious
Identity
In certain Islamic countries with mixed stock markets, the articles
of association for the firm allow us to clearly distinguish religious
and non-religious institutional traders. For example, in Kuwait, both
Islamic and non-Islamic firms and shares traded in the KSE are reg-
ulated by the law (No. 7, 2010) of the Capital Market Authority
(CMA). In addition, all institutions seeking to be licensed to operate
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in compliance with Islamic Shariah rules must:9
(i) have articles of association that include a statement permitting the
institution to operate in compliance with Islamic Shariah rules,
(ii) have in their organizational structure an internal Shariah audit
system that is governed by a clear policy to ensure compliance with
Shariah rules, and
(iii) Have an external independent Shariah auditor who specializes in
auditing Shariah compliance for the Islamic institutions’ commercial
and investment transactions.
5.3.3 Institutional Investors’ Holdings Tests
To test our first hypothesis, we analyze institutional investors’ stock
holdings conditional on their religiosity, conducting mean equality
tests, median equality tests, and panel regressions.
Firstly, every month, for each institutional portfolio, we compute
the portfolio weight allocated in each quantile of EISS, with lottery-
type stocks defined as stocks located in the highest quantile of EISS.
Then, we conduct mean and median equality tests for the monthly
holdings between Islamic and non-Islamic institutional portfolios. The
mean equality test is the equality of the monthly time-series average of
means between Islamic and non-Islamic institutional portfolio weights
9For more information, see the law (No. 7, 2010) of the CMA, from Clause
204–209.
126
in each EISS quantile. The median equality test is the equality test
of the monthly time-series median of means between Islamic and non-
Islamic institutional portfolio weights in each EISS quantile.
Baltagi (2008) and Hsiao (2014) suggest that panel data regres-
sion reduces problems associated with estimation bias and multi-
collinearity, controls for individual heterogeneity, and specifies the
time-varying relation between dependent and independent variables.
Thus, we conduct the following panel regression:
LWi,t = α0 + α1IIDi,t + α3PSIZEi,t−1 + α4HHIi,t−1 + εi,t, (5.5)
where LWi,t is the lottery-type stocks weight for institutional investor
i in month t. The independent variables are as follows. IIDi,t is
the institutional investor dummy variable equal to 1 if the institu-
tional investor is Islamic, and 0 if the institutional investor is non-
Islamic; PSIZEi,t−1 is the portfolio size calculated as the log of the
market value of the total institutional equity portfolio; HHIi,t−1 is
the Herfindahl index for portfolio concentration, computed using the
portfolio weights; and εt is the error term. The coefficient α1 indicates
whether the Islamic institutional investors hold more or less lottery-
type stocks than do non-Islamic institutional investors.
Because the data are pooled (panel), heteroskedasticity and au-
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tocorrelation may influence the ordinary least squares (OLS) results.
Thus, we use a cluster-robust variance and covariance estimators to
give us more conservative standard errors (Arellano 2003). In addi-
tion, we include monthly dummies and institutional investor type-
dummies.
5.3.4 Lottery-Type Stocks Returns Test
To test Hypothesis 2, we conduct a series of univariate and time-series
tests.
Firstly, we conduct a series of univariate tests to determine monthly
holdings-returns for Islamic and non-Islamic institutional traders.10
We test the performance of lottery-type stocks focusing on Islamic
and non-Islamic institutional investors’ holdings by sorting them into
quintiles based on their EISS, and calculating the mean and median
returns of the average time-series holdings at each quantile.
Secondly, we examine the monthly time-series returns difference
between the lottery-type stocks portfolios of Islamic and non-Islamic
institutional investors in relation to the CAPM:
IMNt = α + βMRPt + εt, (5.6)
10Because information obtained by institutional traders is short-lived, it is nec-
essary to measure the returns of institutional traders’ monthly holdings.
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where IMNt is the monthly return of Islamic institutional investors’
lottery-type stocks portfolios minus those of non-Islamic institutional
investors, specifically, an equal weighted portfolio long in Islamic
holdings of lottery-type stocks and short in non-Islamic holdings of
lottery-type stocks; α is the intercept representing the excess return
of lottery-type stocks held by Islamic institutional investors; MRPt is
the monthly market risk premium; and εt is the exogenous error term.
In addition, we incorporate the factors of Fama & French (1993)
into the previous time-series test:
IMNt = α + β1MRPt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + εt, (5.7)
where SMBt is the return of a small minus big market capitalization
portfolio in month t, and HMLt is the return of a high minus low
book-to-market portfolio in month t.
5.3.5 Islamic Lottery-Type Stocks Test
To test Hypothesis 3, we determine the ownership structure for Islamic
lottery-type stocks. Consistent with our hypothesis, we expect that
non-Islamic traders speculate on Islamic lottery-type stocks. Particu-
larly, we expect that Islamic stocks with higher non-Islamic ownership
will have more lottery-type characteristics. Allowing that excessive
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speculation is prohibited in Islam and Islamic institutional traders
are expected to speculate less than do those that are non-Islamic.
Thus, we anticipate that as non-Islamic ownership increases in Islamic
stocks, these stocks will tend to be more lottery-type.
Firstly, we conduct a series of univariate tests to determine the
ownership structure of the Islamic stocks sorted in quantiles based
on their EISS, where the highest quantile of EISS is categorized
as Islamic lottery-type stocks. The ratio of non-Islamic to Islamic
ownership NIRi,t is measured for each Islamic stock i in month t as:
NIRi,t =
(1 +NIOi,t)
(1 + IIOi,t)
− 1, (5.8)
where NIO is the percentage of non-Islamic ownership in stock i in
month t, and IIO is the percentage of Islamic ownership in stock i in
month t.
Secondly, we conduct the following panel regression:
NIRi,t = α0 + α1ILTDi,t + βXi,t + εi,t, (5.9)
where NIRi,t is the ratio of non-Islamic to Islamic ownership in Is-
lamic stock i in month t; ILTDi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
stock is Islamic lottery-type, and 0 if the Islamic stock is non-lottery-
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type; stock Xi,t as the firm-specific characteristics; and εt as the error
term. The firm-specific characteristic variables Xi,t are the idiosyn-
cratic skewness for stock i for the month t, ISSi,t; the idiosyncratic
volatility for stock i for the month t, ISVi,t; the log market capital-
ization for stock i for the month t, LSIZEi,t; the monthly industry
rolling beta for stock i, calculated from the previous three years; the
monthly turnover ratio for stock i for the month t, TOVi,t; the av-
erage monthly return for stock i in the previous 12 months, RETi,t;
the governmental institutions’ ownership percentage in stock i for the
month t, GOi,t; and the family institutions’ ownership percentage in
stock i for the month t, FOi,t. The coefficient α1 indicates whether
the non-Islamic ownership is positively or negatively related to the
probability of the Islamic stock being lottery-type.
Firstly, we estimate our model using an ordinary least squares
(OLS) framework. In addition, we include stock level industry dum-
mies to control for the industry effect. Because, NIRi,t may be highly
correlated across-time and in the cross-section (between stocks), we
repeat the tests with “seemingly unrelated regression” (SUR) in a
generalized least squares (GLS) framework (see, Greene 2007).
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5.4 Data
The primary data for our study consists of the monthly stock holdings
for both Islamic and non-Islamic firms listed on the Kuwait Stock Ex-
change (KSE). The holdings data was obtained from the Aljoman
Center for Economic Consultancy, which includes all institutional
holdings that exceed 5% of the ownership of the stock for the pe-
riod from 2007–2014. Besides the institutional datasets, several other
datasets are used in this study. Monthly return, volume, number
of shares outstanding, market capitalization, firm age, and quarterly
book value of common equity were obtained directly from Thomson
Datastream. We calculated the monthly SMBt and HMLt, Fama &
French (1993) size and book-to-market return mimicking portfolios,
respectively, where SMBt is the difference in returns between small
and big market capitalization portfolios in month t, and HMLt is the
difference in returns between high and low book-to-market portfolios
in month t. We rank all stocks based on their market capitaliza-
tion and use the 50th percentile as a breakpoint between small and
big size portfolios. The book-to-market breakpoints are the 30th and
70th percentile to generate high, medium, and low book-to-market
portfolios. We used Style Research Ltd online tools to construct the
monthly Fama & French (1993) factor portfolios.
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Table 5.1 shows Kuwait religious and market indicators. As previ-
ously noted, the population of Kuwait is highly religious with an 86.5%
level of religiosity, with the majority of the population being Muslim
(86.4%). Table 5.2 shows the summary statistics for the portfolios of
the institutional investors in our data, which shows that the majority
of the institutional investors are non-Islamic. The portfolio size and
concentration are different between Islamic and non-Islamic. Thus,
we need to control for these differences when we compare Islamic and
non-Islamic investors’ portfolios. Furthermore, the summary statis-
tics show that Islamic institutional investors hold more lottery-type
stocks than do those that are non-Islamic, which contradicts our first
hypothesis and, thus, requires more detailed testing.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Institutional Investors’ Holdings Tests
Following Hypotheses 1, we expect that Islamic institutional traders
are more averse to owning lottery-type (gambling) stocks than are
non-Islamic institutional traders.
In contrast to our first hypothesis, the results of the mean and
median equality tests in Table 5.3 suggest that Islamic institutional
traders hold more lottery-type (gambling) stocks than do non-Islamic
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institutional traders. Islamic institutional investors hold 37% of their
portfolio in lottery-type stocks, which is more than the 25% held by
those that are non-Islamic.
To insure that our results are not biased due to the characteristics
of institutional portfolios, we conduct a panel regression controlling
for the portfolio size and concentration. The results of the panel
regression in Panel A of Table 5.4 are consistent with the mean and
median equality tests (the Islamic institutional investors’ dummy IID
is significantly positive, indicating that Islamic institutional investors
hold more lottery-type stocks than do those that are non-Islamic).
The results in Panels B and C of Table 5.4 confirm our conclusions
when we repeat the tests including monthly dummies as well as when
we include institution-type dummies.
5.5.2 Lottery-Type Stock Returns Test
Following Hypotheses 2, we expect that “gambling-averse” Islamic in-
stitutional investors outperform “gambling-tolerant” non-Islamic in-
stitutional investors when the former invest against their norms in
lottery-type stocks. In other words, Islamic institutional investors are
willing to invest against their norms only when they expect high per-
formance through access to private information (see, Kumar & Page
2014).
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Consistent with our second hypothesis, the results of the mean
test in Panel A of Table 5.5 suggest that lottery-type stocks held by
Islamic institutional investors outperform those held by non-Islamic
institutional investors by an average of 0.06% monthly (t-statistic =
2.48). The results of the median test in Panel B of Table 5.5 suggest
that lottery-type stocks held by Islamic institutional investors outper-
form those held by non-Islamic institutional investors by a median of
0.04% monthly (t-statistic = 2.48).
To ensure that our results are not biased, we conduct a time-series
regression controlling for established market return factors, the market
risk premium of the CAPM, size, and book-to-market returns mim-
icking portfolios of Fama & French’s 1993 three-factor model. The
results of the time-series tests in Table 5.6 suggest that the portfolios
of lottery-type stocks held by Islamic institutional investors outper-
form those held by non-Islamic institutional investors in relation to
the CAPM and three-factor model, both with an α that yields 10bps
per month at the 5% level of significance.
5.5.3 Islamic Lottery-Type Stocks Test
Following Hypotheses 3, we expect that as the ownership of non-
Islamic institutions increases in Islamic stocks, Islamic stocks are more
likely to exhibit lottery-type stock characteristics.
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In contrast to our third hypothesis, the results of the univari-
ate tests in Table 5.7 shows that as the percentage of non-Islamic-
to-Islamic-ownership ratio NIR increases in Islamic stocks, they ex-
hibit a lower EISS (the measure of lottery-type stocks). Moreover,
the results of the regression tests in Table 5.8 suggest that as the
non-Islamic-to-Islamic-institutional-investor-ownership ratio NIR in-
creases in Islamic stocks, they exhibit lower lottery-type characteris-
tics. Specifically, the OLS regression results in Panel A of Table 5.8
suggest that the Islamic lottery-type stock dummy ILTD in the eight
regression steps is negatively related to the NIR, and is significant
in four of the eight regressions. These results are more highly signifi-
cant when we control for industry differences, as revealed in Panel B
of Table 5.8, where ILTD in the eight regression steps is negatively
related to the NIR, and significant in seven of the eight regressions.
Finally, we derive similar conclusions using a “seemingly unrelated
regression” (SUR) in a generalized least squares (GLS) framework, as
shown in Panel C of Table 5.8.
These results are consistent with our previous results for testing
Hypothesis 1 and suggest that Islamic institutional investors deviate
from their religious norms by owning higher portions of lottery-type
stocks in their portfolios than do non-Islamic institutional investors.
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5.6 Conclusion
Extant research suggests that religiosity is negatively related to in-
vestors’ speculation behavior and preference for holding lottery-type
stocks (e.g., Kumar 2009, Hilary & Hui 2009, Kumar et al. 2011).
Nevertheless, “gambling-averse” religious investors may deviate from
their norms against holding lottery-type stocks if they have significant
insider information and expect higher returns (Kumar & Page 2014).
The questions we address in this study are whether the negative re-
lationship between investors’ preference to hold lottery-type stocks
and religiosity holds in an Islamic context, and whether Islamic insti-
tutional investors deviate from their norms when they expect higher
returns from lottery-type stocks.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. In contrast with
our first hypothesis, we find that Islamic institutional investors hold
more lottery-type stocks in their portfolios than do non-Islamic insti-
tutional investors. This deviation from Islamic norms may be due to
Islamic institutional traders having stronger information signals to in-
duce them to trade stocks with high skewness. Our analysis suggests
that lottery-type stocks held by Islamic institutional investors earn,
on average, 0.06% per month higher than those held by non-Islamic
institutional investors (t-statistic = 2.48). Finally, our analysis sug-
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gests that as the percentage of non-Islamic institutional ownership
increases in Islamic stocks, they exhibit lower lottery-type stock char-
acteristics, supporting the idea that Islamic institutional traders devi-
ate from their norms against holding lottery-type stocks and gambling
in stock markets.
The implications of our study are important for regulators and
Islamic Shariah auditors in countries that provide Islamic operation
licenses. We suggest that regulators and Islamic Shariah auditors
may need to more effectively regulate to ensure that the operations of
Islamic institutions are free from excessive uncertainty (Gharar), as
they ensure that their transactions are free from interest (Riba).
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Appendix I to Chapter 5: Tables
Table 5.1: Religious Indicators and Market Descriptive Statistics for Kuwait
This table presents Kuwait religious and stock market indicators. The total population and percentage of Muslims to
total population are based on the PEW Research Center’s 2011 report “The Future of the Global Muslim Population”.
The religiosity index is from the World Values Survey (2010–2014). The total market capitalization as of 31 December
2014 and the average market capitalization for listed firms are in U.S. dollars from Bloomberg. The number of listed
Islamic firms as of December 31, 2014, is from Al-Mashora and Al-Raya for the Islamic Financial Consultancy.
Variable Value
Total Population (millions) 2.74
Muslims to Total Population (%) 86.4
Religiosity Index 86.5
Market Cap in US$ (millions) 101,179
Average Firm Market Cap in US$ (millions) 562
Number of Listed Firms 203
Number of Islamic Firms 62
Percentage of Islamic Firms (%) 31
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Table 5.2: Summary Statistics of Institutional Investors’ Portfolios
This table presents the summary statistics of the Islamic and non-Islamic institutional investors’ portfolios from 2007–
2014. The mean is the time-series average of means and the median is the time-series median of means. Number of
Institutions is the monthly number of institutions with holdings. PSIZE is the monthly natural logarithm of the
portfolio assets in local currency in thousands. HHI is the Herfindahl index portfolio concentration computed using
the portfolio weights. Lottery-Type Weight is the proportion of the portfolio allocated in lottery stocks, defined as
those in the highest quintile of expected idiosyncratic skewness (EISS). Return is the monthly equal-weighted return
to institutional holdings.
Panel A: Average Time-Series of Means
Islamic Institutional Non-Islamic Institutional
Investors Investors
Number of Institutions 46 137
PSIZE 20.64 26.10
HHI 0.545 0.544
Lottery-Type Weight (%) 37 28
Return (%) -0.070 -0.035
Panel B: Median Time-Series of Means
Islamic Institutional Non-Islamic Institutional
Investors Investors
Number of Institutions 47 139
Portfolio Size 17.29 25.01
HHI 0.550 0.553
Lottery-Type Weight (%) 37 28
Return (%) -0.057 -0.039
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Table 5.3: Quantiles of Portfolio Distributions
This table presents the monthly institutional portfolio distribution allocated in each quantile of EISS. Lottery-type
stocks are defined as those in the highest quintile of expected idiosyncratic skewness (EISS). The mean is the time-series
average of means and the median is the time-series median of means. Panel A presents the mean equality tests between
Islamic and non-Islamic institutional investors’ proportion allocated in each quantile of EISS. Panel B presents the
median equality tests between Islamic and non-Islamic institutional investors’ proportion allocated in each quantile of
EISS. The p-values of the median equality test correspond to a Wilcoxon/MannWhitney (MWW) signed rank median
test.
Panel A: Mean Equality Test
Islamic Institutional Non-Islamic Institutional P-Value
Investors Investors (t-test)
Q1 (Non-Lottery) 0.14 0.18 (0.00)
Q2 0.15 0.18 (0.00)
Q3 0.16 0.19 (0.00)
Q4 0.19 0.17 (0.03)
Q5 (Lottery) 0.37 0.28 (0.00)
Panel B: Median Equality Test
Islamic Institutional Non-Islamic Institutional P-Value
Investors Investors (MWW)
Q1 (Non-Lottery) 0.12 0.18 (0.00)
Q2 0.14 0.18 (0.00)
Q3 0.15 0.19 (0.00)
Q4 0.17 0.16 (0.47)
Q5 (Lottery) 0.37 0.28 (0.00)
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Table 5.4: Institutional Portfolio Lottery-Type Stock Weights
This table presents the panel regressions of institutional lottery-type stock holdings on religion measures for Islamic and
non-Islamic institutions and other control variables. The dependent variable is the monthly weight of the institution’s
portfolio held in lottery-type stocks. IIDi,t is the institutional investor dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the
institutional investor is Islamic, and 0 if the institutional investor is non-Islamic. PSIZEi,t−1 is the log of the market
value of the total institutional equity portfolio. The portfolio concentration is the Herfindahl index HHIi,t−1 computed
using the portfolio weights. Panel A presents the OLS regression results for the monthly weight of lottery-type stocks.
Panel B presents the regression results for the monthly weight of lottery-type stocks including monthly dummies.
Panel C presents the regression results for the monthly weight of lottery-type stocks including institution-type monthly
dummies. Banks and insurance companies are considered “Conservative”, while investment companies, independent
investment advisors, and investment funds are considered “Aggressive”. The sample period is from January 2007
to December 2014. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***1%, **5%, and *10% indicate levels of
significance.
Panel A: OLS Regression
α IID PSIZE HHI
(1) 0.303*** 0.073***
(0.009) (0.025)
(2) 0.383*** 0.076*** -0.039***
(0.014) (0.023) (0.004)
(3) 0.457*** 0.072*** -0.044*** -0.073**
(0.039) (0.023) (0.004) (0.036)
Panel B: Including Monthly Dummies
α IID PSIZE HHI
(1) 0.306*** 0.073***
(0.011) (0.025)
(2) 0.386*** 0.076*** -0.039***
(0.015) (0.023) (0.004)
(3) 0.496*** 0.072*** -0.044*** -0.073**
(0.039) (0.023) (0.004) (0.036)
Panel C: Including Institution-Type Dummies
α IID PSIZE HHI
(1) 0.312*** 0.091***
(0.012) (0.028)
(2) 0.390*** 0.087*** -0.039***
(0.015) (0.026) (0.004)
(3) 0.482*** 0.087*** -0.044*** -0.092**
(0.039) (0.026) (0.004) (0.036)
142
Table 5.5: Quantiles of Portfolio Returns
This table presents the monthly equal-weighted return to institutions’ holdings of stocks in each quintile of EISS.
Lottery-type stocks are defined as those in the highest quintile of expected idiosyncratic skewness (EISS). The returns
are expressed in percentages. The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2014. The value of the one-way
test is reported below the means and medians in parentheses. The values of the mean test correspond to t-statistics,
and the values of the median test correspond to a Wilcoxon signed rank median test.
Panel A: Time-Series Average of Means
Islamic Institutional Non-Islamic Institutional (Islamic)-(Non-Islamic)
Investors Investors Institutional Investors
Q1 (Non-Lottery) -0.09 -0.11 0.02
(-2.19) (-3.85) (0.49)
Q2 -0.03 -0.03 0.00
(-0.68) (-1.04) (0.15)
Q3 0.00 0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (1.08) (-1.26)
Q4 0.10 0.09 0.00
(2.51) (3.00) (0.14)
Q5 (Lottery) 0.17 0.11 0.06
(4.80) (4.21) (2.48)
Panel B: Time-Series Median of Means
Islamic Institutional Non-Islamic Institutional (Islamic)-(Non-Islamic)
Investors Investors Institutional Investors
Q1 (Non-Lottery) -0.09 -0.07 -0.01
(3.05) (3.35) (0.20)
Q2 -0.04 0.01 -0.03
(0.88) (0.46) (0.36)
Q3 -0.01 0.06 -0.01
(0.00) (1.36) (1.46)
Q4 0.10 0.07 -0.04
(2.43) (2.53) (0.43)
Q5 (Lottery) 0.12 0.10 0.04
(4.39) (4.15) (2.48)
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Table 5.6: Return Time-Series Regression Tests
This table reports the coefficients of the portfolio long lottery-type stocks held by Islamic institutional investors and
short lottery-type stocks held by non-Islamic institutional investors (IMNt) from January 2007 to December 2014.
MRPt is an equally weighted market risk premium. SMBt is the portfolio mimicking the return difference between the
stocks of companies with small and big market capitalization. HMLt is the portfolio mimicking the return difference
between high and low book-to-market stocks. The standard errors are in brackets and have been adjusted for serial
correlation using Newey-West correction. ***1 %, **5%, and *10% indicate levels of significance.
α MRP SMB HML
(1) 0.001** 0.007
(0.000) (0.004)
(2) 0.001*** 0.007 0.005
(0.000) (0.004) (0.004)
(3) 0.001** 0.006 0.006 0.002
(0.000) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Table 5.7: Quantiles of Islamic Stock Ownerships
This table presents the monthly NIR of Islamic stocks sorted by stock EISS in percentages. NIR is the ratio of
non-Islamic to Islamic ownership in Islamic stock i in month t. Lottery-type stocks are defined as those in the highest
quintile of expected idiosyncratic skewness (EISS). The mean is the time-series average of means and the median is the
time-series median of means. The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2014. The value of the one-way
test is reported below the means and medians in parentheses. The values of the mean test correspond to t-statistics,
and the values of the median test correspond to a Wilcoxon signed rank median test.
Mean NIR Median NIR
Q1 (Islamic Non-Lottery) 6.02 5.02
(5.91) (5.35)
Q2 12.37 12.17
(8.22) (6.61)
Q3 14.36 12.49
(9.28) (7.42)
Q4 13.48 12.76
(10.65) (7.39)
Q5 (Islamic Lottery) 11.95 11.97
(11.63) (7.57)
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Table 5.8: Islamic Lottery-Type Stock Analysis
The dependent variable is NIRi,t, the ratio of non-Islamic to Islamic ownership in Islamic stock i in month t. ILTDi,t
is the dummy variable equal to 1 if the Islamic stock i is lottery-type, and 0 if the Islamic stock i is non-lottery-type;
ISSi,t is the idiosyncratic skewness for stock i for the month t; ISVi,t is the idiosyncratic volatility for stock i for
the month t; LSIZEi,t is the log market capitalization for stock i for the month t; TOVi,t is the monthly turnover
ratio for stock i for the month t; RETi,t is the average monthly return for stock i in the previous 12 months; GOi,t
is the governmental institutions’ ownership percentage in stock i for the month t; and FOi,t is the family institutions’
ownership percentage in stock i for the month t. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***1%, **5%, and *10% indicate
levels of significance.
Panel A: OLS Regression
α ILTD ISS ISV LSIZE TOV RET GO FO
(1) 0.108*** -0.012
(0.005) (0.008)
(2) 0.108*** 0.004 -0.001
(0.005) (0.009) (0.001)
(3) 0.096*** -0.002 0.004** 0.248***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.002) (0.059)
(4) 0.258*** -0.015* 0.002 0.141** -0.038***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.002) (0.058) (0.002)
(5) 0.254*** -0.012 0.001 0.076 -0.039*** 2.840***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.002) (0.066) (0.003) (0.426)
(6) 0.263*** -0.027** 0.000 0.048 -0.041*** 2.677*** 0.499***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.003) (0.085) (0.003) (0.456) (0.178)
(7) 0.289*** -0.023* -0.001 0.007 -0.051*** 2.852*** 0.564*** 0.715***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.003) (0.084) (0.003) (0.453) (0.177) (0.100)
(8) 0.312*** -0.021* -0.002 -0.011 -0.052*** 2.817*** 0.484** 0.717*** -0.566***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.003) (0.084) (0.003) (0.449) (0.176) (0.100) (0.084)
Panel B: OLS Regression Including Industry Dummies
α ILTD ISS ISV LSIZE TOV RET GO FO
(1) 0.201*** -0.029***
(0.006) (0.007)
(2) 0.209*** -0.019** 0.000
(0.006) (0.008) (0.001)
(3) 0.202*** -0.022*** 0.003* 0.144***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.001) (0.051)
(4) 0.135*** -0.022*** 0.003** 0.162*** 0.018***
(0.016) (0.008) (0.001) (0.051) (0.004)
(5) 0.122*** -0.019** 0.004** 0.159** 0.019*** 1.316***
(0.017) (0.009) (0.002) (0.059) (0.004) (0.386)
(6) 0.127*** -0.023** 0.002 0.090 0.018*** 1.079** 0.718***
(0.018) (0.011) (0.002) (0.077) (0.004) (0.418) (0.161)
(7) 0.172*** -0.019* 0.000 0.038 0.004 1.230 0.829 0.975
(0.018) (0.011) (0.002) (0.075) (0.005) 0.410*** 0.158*** 0.090***
(8) 0.177*** -0.010 -0.001 0.000 0.012** 0.903** 0.712*** 0.979*** -0.908***
(0.018) (0.011) (0.002) (0.074) (0.004) (0.404) (0.156) (0.089) (0.086)
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Table 5.8 (continued)
Panel C: GLS Regression Including Industry Dummies
α ILTD ISS ISV LSIZE TOV RET GO FO
(1) 0.052*** -0.021***
(0.001) (0.0005)
(2) 0.046*** -0.011*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.0005) (0.000)
(3) 0.042*** -0.012*** 0.002* 0.089***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.005)
(4) -0.158*** -0.012*** 0.002** 0.095*** 0.017***
(0.013) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.005) (0.0004)
(5) 0.199*** -0.006*** 0.002** 0.071** 0.019*** 0.69***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.008) (0.0003) (0.067)
(6) 0.116*** -0.006*** 0.002 0.016 0.018*** 0.570*** 0.499***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.011) (0.0005) (0.078) (0.027)
(7) 0.014*** -0.005*** 0.000 -0.007 0.003*** .666*** 0.626*** 0.978***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.012) (0.0007) (0.079) (0.027) (0.007)
(8) 0.170*** -0.002** -0.001*** -0.020* 0.012*** 0.433** 0.528*** 0.980*** -0.905***
(0.024) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.012) (0.0005) (0.076) (0.025) (0.006) (0.011)
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Appendix II to Chapter 5: Summary of
Main Previous Studies
This appendix consists of summaries for the studies related to social
norms and lottery-type stocks. Table 5.9 reports several aspects of
the reviewed studies, including their aims, data length, data type,
econometric techniques used, and main findings.
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Table 5.9: Related Studies of Social Norms and Lottery-Type Stocks
Study
(Authors
& Date)
Aims Sample & Period Data Type
Econometric
Techniques
Main Findings
Kumar
(2009)
To examine
whether the
propensity to
gamble and
investment
decisions are
correlated
 U.S.: 1991–1996
Stock-level; panel
of portfolio
holdings and
trades of a group
of individual
investors from a
U.S. brokerage
house
 Cross-sectional
regressions
 Panel
regressions
 Time-series
regressions
Individual investors
prefer stocks with
lottery features and
investors who live
in Catholic
(Protestant)
environments have
a stronger (weaker)
preference for
lottery-type stocks
Kumar
et al. (2011)
To investigate
whether gambling
propensity would
be stronger in
regions with
higher
concentrations of
Catholics relative
to Protestants
 U.S.: 1980–2005
Stock-level data,
county-level
religious and
demographic
characteristics,
and institutional
ownership data
 Univariate and
multivariate tests
 Multivariate
regression models
In regions with a
high
(Catholic/Protestant)
ratio, investors
exhibit a stronger
propensity to hold
lottery-type stocks
Kumar &
Page (2014)
To test whether
norm-constrained
investors deviate
from such norms
when they predict
to earn high
abnormal returns
 U.S.: 1980–2008
Stock-level data,
county-level
religious and
demographic
characteristics,
and institutional
ownership data
 T-tests
 Multivariate
regression models
Norm-constraining
institutions deviate
from their norms
against holding
lottery-type or sin
stocks when they
expect to earn
relatively high
abnormal returns
Huang
et al. (2014)
To investigate the
reasons Chinese
mutual funds hold
lottery-type
stocks
 China: 1998–2012
Funds-level and
institutional
ownership data
 T-tests
 Multivariate
regression models
In general, Chinese
institutional
investors do not
gamble in stock
markets, but when
they do gamble,
they earn abnormal
returns on
lottery-type
investments; this
abnormal return is
greater for firms
with more ability
to obtain insider
information
148
Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Recapitulation
In this thesis, we avail of data from the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) countries to provide a meaningful illumination of the impact
of religiosity on stock market behavior. Our dataset is from highly
religious societies that have clear religious investment rules and explic-
itly identify both institutional investors and stocks as either “Islamic”
or “non-Islamic”.
The first essay of this thesis (Chapter 3) examines whether investor
social norms in relation to religiosity impede market development. We
test the conjecture that in markets that are dominated by strong so-
cial norms, those stocks that conflict with the accepted norms are
relatively neglected. In this context, we find significant differences in
returns, liquidity and liquidity risk between non-Islamic (neglected)
and Islamic stocks. Specifically, neglected non-Islamic stocks have
higher returns, less liquidity and more liquidity risk in comparison to
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Islamic stocks. Such liquidity differences are likely to be an important
consideration for both retail and institutional investors. Furthermore,
such liquidity segmentation is likely to be of concern for market regu-
lators seeking to enhance market efficiency. Thus, our results highlight
the possible challenges that GCC countries will face as they seek to
emerge as globally competitive stock markets.
The second essay of this thesis (Chapter 4) examines whether a
negative relationship between investor speculation and religiosity ex-
plains the phenomenon of stock market seasonality based on religious
events. Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, the
stock markets of the GCC countries exhibit a lower level of speculation
during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Second, these markets
show no Ramadan abnormal returns when we do not control for the
change in volatility due to a decline in speculation behavior. However,
the significant drop in stock market and idiosyncratic volatility dur-
ing Ramadan leads to higher risk-adjusted returns. We conclude that
the Ramadan effect in previous studies is due to a drop in stock mar-
ket speculation, and not the outcome of positive investor sentiment
(as suggested by previous studies). During Ramadan, Muslims devote
their time to religious practices and their religiosity increases. As
such, they speculate less because excessive stock market speculation
is either forbidden or undesirable in Islam.
150
The third essay of this thesis (Chapter 5) examines whether the
negative relationship between investors’ preference to hold lottery-
type stocks and religiosity holds in an Islamic context, and whether
Islamic institutional investors deviate from their norms when they ex-
pect high returns from lottery-type stocks. Our main results may be
summarized as follows. In contrast with our expectation, we find that
Islamic institutional investors hold more lottery-type stocks in their
portfolios than do non-Islamic institutional investors. This deviation
from Islamic norms may be due to Islamic institutional traders having
stronger information signals (expect high returns) to induce them to
trade stocks with high skewness. Our analysis suggests that lottery-
type stocks held by Islamic institutional investors earn, on average,
0.06% per month higher than those held by non-Islamic institutional
investors (t-statistic = 2.48). The implications of our study are im-
portant for regulators and Islamic Shariah auditors in countries that
provide Islamic operation licenses. We suggest that regulators and
Islamic Shariah auditors may need to be vigilant in monitoring the
activities of Islamic institutions, to ensure that they are free from ex-
cessive uncertainty (Gharar), as they ensure that their transactions
are free from interest (Riba).
Overall, we conclude that Islamic beliefs have a significant influ-
ence on investors’ behavior and stock market outcomes. The regula-
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tors in Islamic societies will need to consider such religious influence
as their stock markets seek to emerge as globally competitive stock
markets. In addition, they may need to strengthen regulations to en-
sure that the operations of Islamic institutions comply with Islamic
Shariah rules.
6.2 Limitations and Future Research
During the preparation of this thesis, we encountered limitations in
data availability, which is normal for researchers working with data for
developing countries. For example, institutional holding data is not
available for the countries of our study, with the exception of Kuwait;
for this reason, in the third essay of our thesis (Chapter 5), we limited
our data to Kuwait.
We suggest that the following topics be investigated in the future
by researchers who are interested in this field: (i) differences in liq-
uidity between Islamic and non-Islamic stocks using intraday liquid-
ity measurements, (ii) Ramadan return seasonality using a structural
time-series model, (iii) differences in speculation behavior between Is-
lamic and non-Islamic retail traders, using Islamic and non-Islamic
brokerage firm data.
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